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Abstract 
In Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
introduces a theory of spatial justice that takes into consideration the agential capabilities of 
nonhuman legal actors. However, in an effort to decenter the human legal subject, 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues that the co-constitutivity of law and space (the 
lawscape), as the site where (human and nonhuman) legal bodies take shape, cannot be 
mediated through the political. In response to this claim, I argue that spatial justice is an 
inherently political project, and I identify the practice of spatial justice (or performing spatial 
justice) as a means of understanding how to engage the political aspects of this posthuman 
perspective on justice and law. In my final chapter, I compare this theory of spatial justice 
with Indigenous law to demonstrate how spatial justice is performed through practices of 
Indigenous resurgence.  
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Summary for Lay Audience 
This project considers the challenges posed by nonhuman legal actors to conventional forms 
of legal subjectivity. Drawing on the theoretical contributions of Andreas Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, I suggest a practice of spatial justice rooted in the relationship between human 
and nonhuman agents. In support of this approach, I conduct a comparative analysis of this 
practice of spatial justice and Indigenous law, in particular as discussed in the writings of 
John Borrows.  
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Introduction 
“The quasi-logical presupposition of an identity between mental space (the 
space of the philosophers and epistemologists) and real space creates an abyss 
between the mental sphere on one side and the physical and social spheres on 
the other. From time to time some intrepid funambulist will set off to cross the 
void, giving a great show and sending a delightful shudder through the 
onlookers. By and large, however, so-called philosophical thinking recoils at 
the mere suggestion of any such salto mortale.”  
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space 
In Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
takes a salto mortale by proposing a co-constitutivity of law and space that recognizes the 
centrality of material agency, and introduces a new dimension to the concept of spatial 
justice. This conceptualization of spatial justice pushes the boundaries of legal 
subjectivity to reveal the role of nonhuman or more-than-human actors in legal processes, 
and to provide an introduction to what a posthumanist theory of justice might look like. I 
argue this conceptualization of spatial justice makes a substantial contribution to political 
thinking as well by introducing the idea that these posthuman legal assemblages can 
perform spatial justice.  
The co-constitutivity of law and space is a concept introduced by legal geographers to 
describe how laws and regulations influence everyday life, and in particular, how they 
limit or facilitate forms of political resistance. However, while this approach engages 
with the idea that law is materially expressed, oftentimes nonhuman agents are sidelined 
in order to foreground the social and political implications of law’s spatiality. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos adopts the idea that law and space are mutually 
constitutive, but he focuses on the role played by nonhuman legal agents in shaping this 
relationship. However, in order to posit a posthumanist theory of spatial justice and 
distinguish this project from prior formulations of spatial justice, Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos claims that the co-constitutivity of law and space, which he names the 
lawscape (a tautology of law and space), is not mediated by the political. According to 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, focusing on the political dimension of this relationship 
detracts from a properly spatial and material analysis of law because it centers it on 
humanist concerns, like social process and power relations. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
recognizes that a posthumanist theory of justice must interrogate the question of legal 
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agency in novel ways, as there is no human liberal subject that can exercise its will, but 
rather assemblages (or ‘situated’ collectivities) that produce it. However, I argue that 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos also shows that agency is articulated through these 
assemblages, and in a sense, gives us an idea of what a politics of spatial justice might 
entail. More specifically, I argue that a legal assemblage’s ability to reorient the 
lawscape, which is the first step towards spatial justice, demonstrates that there is a form 
of agential capability which acknowledges that assemblages engage in political practice.  
The legal assemblages (or ‘situated’ collectivities) that replace the traditional legal 
subject can perform spatial justice through the process of withdrawal. I argue that this 
material and spatial process, which demands an attunement to materiality and spatiality, 
as more than limit or container, introduces a form of ethical practice that can guide legal 
and political engagement. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ assemblages engage in this 
process of withdrawal because they operate as conative bodies, which are perpetually 
striving to sustain themselves, while simultaneously engaging in creative and productive 
ontological processes. The crux of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory rests in a shift 
from thinking through the abstract positionality of a liberal legal subject to the materiality 
of a legal body (or assemblage) that reveals the tensions and complex legal (and political) 
entanglements that these bodies must negotiate through their positionality. His theoretical 
approach allows us to understand how the relationships between human and non-human 
agents unfold, and how they may be harnessed to shift the parameters of current 
lawscapes in order to give rise to spatial justice. According to Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, these transformative movements can only occur at the level of the 
lawscape (or the material manifestation of laws and regulations), and as such, they 
engage both human and non-human legal agents. As legal practice is increasingly coming 
to terms with the presence of non-human legal actors (e.g. the environment, animals, 
artificial intelligence), the field will have to consider how these actors affect the ways in 
which we have traditionally framed legal subjectivity, a relationship which is formed 
through very specific understandings of an individual’s relationship to land, for example.  
As I considered examples of performing spatial justice, I began to note similarities 
between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ concepts and ethical and political practices 
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outlined through theorizations of Indigenous law. In my final chapter I engage in a 
comparative analysis of spatial justice and withdrawal with Indigenous legal philosophy 
and resurgence. The treatment of the more-than-human in Indigenous theory provides an 
example of how ethical practice can be shifted through a more resolute engagement with 
spatiality and the nonhuman. Indigenous commitment to a form of social, political and 
legal organization based on the idea of a ‘physical’ philosophy that is centered on the 
idea of mobility, contradiction, and an attunement to ‘situatedness’, as well as the concept 
of ‘all our relations’ which de-centers the human, contribute to this discussion in a 
significant way. My knowledge of these theories is derived primarily from the writings of 
Anishinaabe legal scholar, John Borrows; however, I believe there is room to expand this 
engagement beyond what I have outlined in the thesis, and to consider more carefully 
how Indigenous law can play a role in re-framing our understanding of legal subjectivity.   
This thesis is structured as a monograph comprised of three chapters. The first chapter 
consists of a literature review of the concept of spatial justice which addresses, in 
particular, the ways in which different schools of thought have interrogated the political 
potential of the concept. By arguing that the question of justice engages the political and 
by demonstrating that power relations remain at the core of Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ concept of spatial justice, I show that the relationship between justice and 
politics persists. The literature review begins with an analysis of the writings of critical 
human geographers like David Harvey and Ed Soja, who have played an instrumental 
role in introducing and shaping the concept of spatial justice. Then, I discuss the work of 
legal geographers, like Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, Irus Braverman and Mariana 
Valverde, whose writing on the mutual constitutivity of law and space has been central to 
discussions about the shifting nature of the social and the political in these types of 
discourses. I also address legal geography’s engagement with posthumanism, as its most 
recent theoretical frontier. Finally, in this first chapter, I unpack some of Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos central concepts (i.e. spatial justice, lawscape, lively agency, continuum, 
and atmosphere) in order to demonstrate how it is that he frames the mutual constitutivity 
of law and spatiality and how he considers the role of matter in this process.  
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The second chapter outlines how assemblages engage in a practice of spatial justice by 
delving deeper into Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ framework. By unpacking 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos concepts of lawscape and withdrawal along some of his 
main theoretical influences: David Delaney, Doreen Massey, Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari and Karen Barad, I show how we can draw out a political project from his theory 
of spatial justice. These individuals help to elucidate the political potential of 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ complex theoretical project; however, I note the influence 
of Gilles Deleuze’s writing in The Fold, in particular, as a means of reading withdrawal 
as becoming. Deleuze’s writing aids in our understanding of the processes of folding that 
sustain the onto-epistemological project of spatial justice, while also maintaining a 
creative potential through withdrawal and closure.  
As I noted above, the third chapter consists of a comparative analysis between 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ spatial justice and John Borrows’ writing on Indigenous 
law and ‘situated’ freedom. According to Borrows, Anishinaabe law is centered on 
mobility and agency (as human and more-than-human) which demonstrates an 
attunement to positionality that is responsive to the more-than-human. I believe that the 
following examples of Indigenous resurgences show what a practice or performance of 
spatial justice entails. I draw on two concrete examples of how Indigenous knowledge 
plays a central role in resurgent practice, and how it can serve to reorient lawscapes and 
open up the possibility of attaining spatial justice: (1) Rebecca Belmore’s performance in 
Queen’s Park on Canada Day in 2012; and (2) the blockade on Unist’ot’en and 
Wet’suwet’en land that has been in place since 2009. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Literature Review of Spatial Justice 
1.1 Introduction 
This literature review provides an overview of the main theoretical perspectives that have 
contributed to the development of a concept of spatial justice. In recent years, critical 
scholarship has renewed its interest in the relationship between law and spatiality, 
specifically with respect to its influence on legal subjectivity and the practice of social 
justice lawyering.1 Although the co-constitutivity of law and space has been a concern for 
the emerging, interdisciplinary field of legal geography, critical legal scholars have also 
developed a keen interest in the intersection between law and space. One notable figure 
of this movement is critical legal scholar, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, whose 
recent book, Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, develops an insightful theory 
of the role of space and materiality in relation to law and justice, primarily by adopting a 
post-humanist feminist lens. His theory of spatial justice opens up the possibility of 
thinking about nonhuman legal agency, and in the process, broadens the scope of the 
influence of law in everyday life, and the notion of legal and political resistance. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has taken a bold, but timely, leap in a field whose 
foundation is rooted in a property relation that is decidedly humanist: “the basic notion of 
property as the relationship among people in respect of objects.”2 By de-centering the 
human legal subject, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos also influences the role of politics in 
relation to subjectivity, spatiality and law. He argues that in order to understand this 
posthumanist theory of justice the mutual constiutivity of law and space should not be 
                                                 
       
1
 The interdisciplinary field of legal geography has garnered a lot of interest since the publication of 
Blomely, Nicholas, David Delaney and Richard T. Ford, editors. Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, 
and Space. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. 
       
2
 Mary Jane Mossman and Phillip Girard, Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 3rd ed. (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery Publications, 2014), 3.  
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mediated by a political theoretical lens.3 However, as this literature review will 
demonstrate, the concept of spatial justice has been defined by its ‘political’ contribution 
to the theorization and practice of law, insofar as it points out spatial manifestations of 
power struggles, primarily based on class difference. In order to reflect on the 
significance of this concept to legal scholarship, I believe we need to give further 
consideration to the relationship between legal subjectivity, justice and space, and 
political practice.  
This literature review addresses the political dimension of spatial justice and theories of 
space in relation to legal subjectivity. I am interested in the persistence of the political, 
through a practice of spatial justice, in relation to a legal context in which the human 
legal subject is decentered and the influence of nonhuman agency is brought to the 
forefront. By centering the question of the ‘political’ in this discussion of spatial justice, I 
establish that it is not possible (nor necessary) to relinquish this dimension in order to 
craft a posthuman theory of justice.  
In order to capture the impact of posthumanism on our current understanding of legal 
subjectivity, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues, in part, that the co-constitutivity of 
law and spatiality is not dependent on human relationality. Although the mutual 
constitutivity of law and space is a foundational premise of legal geography scholarship, 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ desire to craft a theory of law and justice that captures the 
agency of the nonhuman distinguishes his work from that of more traditional strands of 
legal geography. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues that space (or matter, in this case) 
is also a participant in the process of ontological negotiation in which human bodies 
engage, rather than its container, and that it can maintain its own sense of legal (and 
political) agency. The mutual constitutivity of law and space gives shape to the borders, 
conflicts and movements of these bodies in a much more fundamental sense, and as such, 
it gives rise to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos claim that there is no outside to law.4 
                                                 
       
3
 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere (New York: 
Routledge, 2015), 19. 
      
4
 Ibid., 1. 
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This literature review is organized into three sections. The first two sections will serve as 
a theoretical background on spatial justice as a concept that has emerged primarily within 
the discipline of geography. The first section will address the critical foundations of the 
concept, primarily within the works of David Harvey and Edward Soja. This formulation 
of spatial justice is tightly knit to the concept of social justice, demonstrating its Marxist 
political roots, as well as the influence of postmodern thought on its early 
conceptualizations.  
The second section will address the emerging field of legal geography, demonstrating the 
concept’s more direct relationship to law, yet maintaining a resolutely political 
perspective through the authors’ concerns with the relationship between law and power. 
This section will consider the writings of early legal geographers, like Nicholas Blomley 
and David Delaney, as well as those of more recent figures, like Irus Braverman. This 
trajectory marks a shift in legal geography scholarship from socio-legal relations to 
human-nonhuman legal relations. As an emerging interdisciplinary field, legal geography 
settles somewhere between geographical and legal thought, though it encounters 
difficulty framing the writings of scholars like Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and 
Mariana Valverde, who are rethinking the foundations of the relationship between law 
and space.5  
In the third section, I will discuss the influence of posthumanist thought on the concept of 
spatial justice through the work of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos. At this point, I will 
refer to a few of the main concepts that arise in his theory of spatial justice: lawscape, 
atmosphere, withdrawal, responsibility of indistinction and lively agencies. In particular, 
the last part of this section will discuss the notion of lively agencies as a counterpoint to 
legal subjectivity. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of justice engages with the blind 
spot created by a resolutely humanist perspective, and introduces legal theory to a 
philosophical debate on materiality, subjectivity and agency. I contend that this theory of 
justice presents us with an alternative ethical framework that is sensitive to the agential 
                                                 
     
5
 David Delaney, “Legal Geography III: New Worlds, New Convergences,” Progress in Human 
Geography 41 (2017): 668, doi: 10.1177/0309132516650354. 
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capabilities of the nonhuman legal actor, while opening up our thinking on new forms of 
political engagement.  
1.2 Spatial Justice as Social Justice 
1.2.1 David Harvey’s Social Justice 
During the 1970s, a desire for a more critical and philosophical engagement with the 
concept of space within geographical studies gave rise to the field of critical human 
geography.6 The concept of spatial justice was formulated during this time, and it is 
primarily associated with the writings of Marxist geographer, David Harvey, whose 
seminal work, Social Justice and the City, introduces a theory of social justice premised 
on the idea that spatial form and social process inform each other.7  
Influenced by the writings of French Marxist thinker Henri Lefebvre, Harvey proposes 
“historical-geographical materialism [as] method of inquiry” effectively shifting the 
direction of geographical scholarly work towards a more purposeful engagement with 
class analysis through spatiality.8 However, as Ed Soja notes, Harvey’s spatial analysis is 
primarily focused on social process, rather than the dialectical relationship between the 
social and the spatial.9 In order to explain the impact of human practice on social and 
political issues, Harvey notes that,  
“spatial forms are…seen not as inanimate objects within which the social process 
unfolds, but as things which ‘contain’ social processes in the same manner that social 
process are spatial.”10  
                                                 
        
6
 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory 
(New York: Verso Books, 1989), 43. 
        
7
 Ibid., 51. 
        
8
 Ibid., 44 and 52. 
        
9
 Ibid., 58. 
       
10
 David Harvey, Social Justice and the City: Revised Edition (Athens, Georgia: The University of 
Georgia Press, 2009), 10-11. 
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This statement indicates that social processes are produced and reproduced through 
particular spatial arrangements, and that the way spaces are framed will influence how 
social processes operate.11 However, this particular approach privileges the role of social 
process (and human relations) in crafting these spaces without considering the 
significance of the relationship between the two.12 The idea that spatial forms act as 
‘containers’ for social processes does not provide sufficient insight into the capacity of 
space to influence social process (and of course, no insight into the agential capabilities 
of the nonhuman), except insofar as it sustains and responds to human action.  
This theoretical perspective diverges from Lefebvre’s objective regarding the  
“socio-spatial dialectic: that social and spatial relations are dialectically inter-
reactive, interdependent; that social relations of production are both space-
forming and space-contingent (at least insofar as we maintain, to begin with, a 
view of organized space as socially constructed).”13  
Arguably, this tension strikes at the heart of the literature review because the way in 
which the relationship between the spatial and the social is formulated impacts the 
definition of subjectivity, which in turn bears implications for the legal and political 
dimensions of the discussion. Taking Soja’s concern with Harvey a step further, 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is critical of this cautiously humanist theoretical 
engagement with space because it “ignor[es] ecological, technological and other 
production processes that eschew the ‘social’ in its narrow, anthropocentric 
description.”14 However, I argue that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ concern with this 
narrow definition of the ‘social’ is superimposed on his understanding of the limits of 
political engagement, and that while the constitutive relationship between law and space 
might provide us with a formulation that is more suited to capture the agential capability 
of the non-human, it should not concern itself with the political. However, I am cautious 
                                                 
       
11
 Soja, Postmodern Geographies, 76-77. 
       
12
 Ibid., 57. 
       
13
 Ibid., 81. 
       
14
 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice, 179. 
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of this formulation and propose that politics remains central to this conversation, though 
it might not be formulated in a traditional Marxist sense.    
1.2.2 Edward W. Soja’s Spatial Justice 
Edward Soja is also concerned with the constitutive relationship between the subject and 
their spatialized existence, and he wants to return the analysis closer to Lefebvre’s 
conceptualization of social and spatial relations. However, his focus on discourse and 
representation does not manage to push the question of spatiality as effectively as 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos. 
Due to his focus on epistemological analytical frameworks, his spatial analysis remains 
firmly positioned within the realm of textuality and representation. This fact is evident in 
his early treatment of physical space and matter as a mere empirical concern: 
“Space as physical context has generated broad philosophical interest and lengthy 
discussions of its absolute and relative properties (a long debate which goes back to 
Leibniz and beyond), its characteristics as environmental ‘container’ of human life, 
its objectifiable geometry, and its phenomenological essences. But this physical space 
has been a misleading epistemological foundation upon which to analyse the concrete 
and subjective meaning of human spatiality. Space in itself may be primordially 
given, but the organization, and meaning of space is a product of social translation, 
transformation, and experience.”15 
And, while it may be difficult to discount the value of Soja’s contribution, as well as that 
of other geographical thinkers, it limits our ability to engage with space, materiality and 
the nonhuman more seriously as long as its focus is resolutely centered on human 
sociality. Therefore, Soja’s engagement with the concept of spatial justice is limited by 
this understanding of space.  
This approach is further solidified in Seeking Spatial Justice: Globalization and 
Community, where Soja mediates our understanding of spatial justice through a 
politically pragmatic ‘right to occupy or inhabit’.16 While this may be an effective means 
                                                 
       
15
 Soja, Postmodern Geographies, 79-80. 
       
16
 Edward W. Soja, Seeking Spatial Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 109. 
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of mobilizing groups and presenting arguments in favour of inclusion into a liberal 
political context, it limits our understanding of the agential capabilities of more-than-
human actors, and frames spatial justice as a form of social justice sensitive to its spatial 
containers.17  
Soja defines ‘spatial consciousness’ in this framework as “a way of thinking that 
recognize[s] that space is filled with politics and privileges, ideologies and cultural 
collisions, utopian ideals and dystopian oppression, justice and injustice, oppressive 
power and the possibility of emancipation.”18 Although this approach attunes us to spaces 
as the locus of diversity, power struggles and contingency, it represents agents as 
“inescapably embedded” in space and geography, collapsing the temporality of these 
encounters and relations, and in a sense, ‘freezing’ these individuals in space.19 This 
approach establishes a political identity from which the individual can act, since he 
claims that the individual maintains the “particularized contingency” of the spaces they 
inhabit.20 However, if the particularities of our social context become static and 
immutable characteristics of individual experience, then there is little opportunity for a 
re-examination of these forms of representation.21As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos notes, 
this is merely “a bringing into light of the spaces in which social (in)justice can be 
located while conceptualizing itself and the world,” which brings to light one of the main 
difficulties with a particular understanding of an identity politics approach, namely using 
particular identity positions as universal and fixed markers of individual experience.22  
                                                 
       
17
 Ibid., 109. 
       
18
 Ibid., 103. 
       
19
 Ibid., 71. 
       
20
 Ibid., 68-71. 
       
21
 Ibid., 71.  
       
22
 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice, 180. 
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However, this debate has been quite pervasive, in particular within feminist political and 
legal theory. In Beyond Identity Politics: Feminism, Power, Politics, Moya Lloyd 
proposes an alternative conceptualization: the “‘subject-in-process,’ a term [used] to 
capture the idea that subjectivity is constituted (by language, discourse, or power), 
inessential and thus perpetually open to transformation.”23 Although Lloyd’s theory relies 
on discourse and language, it turns away from Soja’s ‘situated’ political agent by 
maintaining open the possibility for a readjustment of positionality and tactics in order to 
acknowledge “a proliferation of possible sites of political contestation.”24 Lloyd’s work 
can be interpreted to claim that materialism and embodiment are considered through a 
form of ‘situatedness’ that does not reduce the individual to a category by capturing the 
significance of movement and mobility. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s theory of spatial 
justice attempts to capture this mobile and shifting subjectivity in the form of 
assemblages. Although I will revisit this concept in more detail in the final section, I do 
want to note that the operations of these legal assemblages can be indicative of a political 
process.  
1.2.3 Conclusion 
These formulations of spatial justice as social justice pose two problems that may serve to 
limit the possibility of justice: (1) spatiality is limited to the operations of social processes 
and constraints that result from human practice; and (2) political engagement is premised 
on a static identity framed through these constricting spatialities. Then, we can surmise 
that in order to understand a more responsive form of political action we need to think of 
the spatial and material differently. Legal geographers, who infuse Soja’s perspective on 
the role of spatiality within the legal context, have attempted to address the question of 
structure or context by arguing for the mutual constitutivity of law and space. The next 
part of this literature review will engage with their work, and their understanding of the 
concept of spatial justice. 
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1.3  Law, Politics, and Space: Legal Geography and Spatial 
Justice 
Legal geography is an interdisciplinary area of study that emerged in the early 1990s, and 
is influenced, at least in part, by the writings of critical human geographers. This ‘field’ 
was developed by individuals interested in the intersection between law, space and power 
within the human geography context,25 and as such, it aims to uncover the ways in which 
power relations operate through spatio-legal mechanisms. Legal geography is concerned 
with the ways in which,  
“Distinctively legal forms of meaning are projected onto every segment of the 
physical world. These meanings are open to interpretation and may become caught up 
in a range of legal practices. Such fragments of a socially segmented world – the 
where of law – are not simply the inert sites of law but are inextricably implicated in 
how law happens.”26 
The engagement with spatiality in this context is reminiscent of that of critical human 
geographers insofar as social process is replaced with a socio-legal process which 
highlights how the law plays a role in sustaining and framing violence and injustice 
through seemingly innocuous every day processes. However, the legal geographers’ 
approach to the co-constitutions of law and space, especially where it intersects with 
theories of performativity, engages with spatiality in a different way.  
Although legal geographers do not always employ the term spatial justice explicitly, as 
their work is concerned with the convergence of law, space, and power, it does address 
the question of justice indirectly. However, David Delaney provides a useful summary of 
legal geography’s concern with spatial justice: 
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“…because traces of the legal are commonly constitutive of the spatialities of 
injustice – underpinning them, shaping relations of power with respect to them, 
rendering places meaningful in distinctively legal ways – then much of what legal 
geographers do is to investigate the contingencies and constraints of spatial justice… 
Legal geographers take us into the workshops where space, law and (in)justice are the 
means of the co-production of each other…(In)justice is intrinsically social and 
relational in the sense that claims of injustice necessarily call into account inherently 
social states of affairs concerning contingent social arrangements – including socio-
spatial arrangements. ”27 
Delaney’s desire to centre the social at the core of this discussion of justice, firmly 
positions a humanist perspective at the core of the project as well. An engagement from 
this perspective provides insights into how certain socio-legal mechanisms function, but 
give us little in the way of guidance beyond their relations of power.  
Early investigations into the intersection between law and geography stirred a lively 
debate between legal theorists influenced by radical politics and those interested in the 
theoretical contributions of post-structuralism. The former argue that the aesthetic 
projects of the ‘linguistic turn’ circumvent more practical theoretical initiatives and as a 
result hinder social change.28 At its core, the argument turns on the relationship between 
representation and materiality in socio-legal debates. This debate reverberates into our 
current discussion, as legal geography is a propitious theoretical lens through which to 
think about the relationship between the abstract and the concrete dimension of space. 
However, Chouinard argues that these fields are more complementary than they seem: 
“[l]aw’s space not only threads its way through our daily lives, often in the 
‘background’ of our conscience, but it is also a material and conceptual medium 
through which people fight for the control and use of space itself.”29 
In this example, space as a “tapestry of relations and practices”30 is being represented 
both materially and discursively. It unfolds as a narrative of the world that is being 
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produced and re-produced through the contributions of those who take part in it, on a 
constant basis. As I will later argue, this perspective does not have to exclude the 
contributions of the nonhuman in the negotiation of these spaces of law.   
Chouinard seems to suggest that materiality forms a bridge between politics and 
language, and the epistemological limitations of discourse analyses can be overcome 
through a better understanding of the political conditions of those contexts so that 
“representations of radicalism [do not] become more important than political praxis.”31 
As a reflection on legal geography’s future, Chouinard states,   
“A more inclusive radical geography of law and other sites of social conflict also 
requires efforts to develop more dynamic conceptions of how and why individual 
and collective identities form in specific times and places (Chouinard, 1994), and 
how these identities translate into practices which sustain, challenge and 
sometimes transform prevailing relations of power in people’s lives, and their 
capacities for effective collective action on social issues. These ‘senses of selves’ 
are not fixed, but evolve as people negotiate material relations of daily life and 
assign and reassign (or ‘appropriate’) meaning to their experiences of lived legal 
relations and circumstances in specific places.”32 
1.3.1 The Co-constitutivity of Law and Space and Performativity 
Legal geographers engage in an analysis of spatio-legal relations in order to demonstrate 
how particular representations of space shape the subjective position of individuals who 
are impacted by the laws or regulations that apply within those spaces. This approach 
informs the oftentimes contested presence of the political in law and legal practice. By 
uncovering the legal discourses that legitimize violence towards particular groups, and 
demonstrating how these are facilitated through specific spaces and sites, legal 
geographers have developed a rich and complex field of scholarship which sheds light on 
the legal narratives of marginalized groups. In this section, I draw on the work of two 
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legal geographers, Nicholas Blomley and David Delaney, to demonstrate legal 
geography’s treatment of politics through the co-constitutivity of law and space.  
Nicholas Blomely is one of the earliest scholars of the intersection between law and 
geography.33 Blomley has written extensively on the property relation and its impact on 
marginalized groups, and demonstrated an interest in understanding it as an abstract, but 
also material concept.34 According to Blomley, property “is not a static, pre-given entity, 
but depends on a continual, active ‘doing,’” which he suggests in a later article “is at once 
practical, symbolic and institutional.”35 In order for property relations (and ultimately 
power relations) to maintain themselves, bodies and technologies are coopted into the 
logic of the space in order to perform the particular dynamics that uphold that space.36 
Therefore, the spatial and material dimension of property needs to be re-enacted and 
performed in order to be sustained. As Blomley explains, 
“Space itself is not only produced through performance, but is simultaneously a 
means of disciplining the performances that are possible within it. These social 
performances are citational, reiterating past performances and thus reproducing 
dominant norms and practices at the same time as they diverge from them. 
Similarly, the enactment of property is dependent upon spaces, whether everyday 
or imagined, material or discursive. The enactment of property, in turn, helps 
constitute those spaces, investing them with particular valences and political 
possibilities.”37 
This quote captures, more or less, the sentiment of legal geographers with respect to 
space, as well as the source of one of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s main critiques, 
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namely that property (or social) relations invest spaces with political possibilities. In this 
sense, we note that space is not an active participant, but rather a framework of 
reproduction of a specific set of relations, and a tool for discipline. However, by engaging 
with these processes through the lens of performativity we are provided with a lens that 
permits us to understand the subjects of law as constituted and thus, potentially shifting.  
In Nomospheric Investigations: The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-
Making, David Delaney presents a methodology for legal geography premised on a 
performative theory of law by analyzing how it is that we engage space and materiality in 
discursive processes. This pivotal text in legal geography is particularly useful here 
because it addresses some of the same concerns Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has with 
the relationship between law and space as not sufficiently spatial. Before I delve into a 
brief explanation of the main concepts introduced by Delaney (i.e. nomoscape, 
nomosphere and nomic technicians), I want to note two significant points of convergence 
between the works of the two theorists: discursive materiality and performance. I will do 
this through the lens of Karen Barad’s posthuman performativity, as it is a concept that 
both theorists use in their writing.38  
Delany’s writing may not engage with nonhuman legal actors, but it does engage with 
objects that act as ‘technologies of delimitation’, like walls, barriers, turnstiles, etc. 
Delaney employs the concept of discursive materiality to create the concept of 
nomicity.39 Like Barad, he invokes performative practice to bridge discourse and our 
material surroundings and explain how we engage in processes of ‘world-making’.40 
Delaney’s project focuses on the production of knowledge in spaces that are dominated 
by particular laws and particular power relations. However, given Barad’s theoretical 
focus, her project aligns itself closer to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ because it claims 
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an agential capability of the nonhuman that is not a concern for Delaney in quite the same 
way. Yet, this point of convergence between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and 
Delaney’s theoretical perspectives remains a useful point of interrogation. 
Due to the fact that the engagement with materiality that emerges in Delaney’s work is 
primarily one that casts matter as a tool or technology,41 for matter to matter then, it must 
provide some use to human actors. In Delaney’s investigation these forms of materiality 
play a role in upholding, and perhaps, recreating asymmetrical power relations. 
Therefore, the human sits at the center of this analysis, and we can clearly see how any 
engagement with spatiality must uphold a social context. This shapes the concepts I will 
summarize below, and thus solidifies the scope of legal geography as an investigation 
into the mutual constitutivity of law and space, where space is to be understood as 
something produced by humans for human use.  
 The ‘nomosphere’ is a driving concept behind Delaney’s work. He defines it as,  
“the cultural-material environs that are constituted by the reciprocal materialization 
of ‘the legal,’ and the legal signification of the ‘socio-spatial,’ and the practical, 
performative engagement through which such constitutive moments happen and 
unfold.”42 
The nomosphere is the product of two concepts, the Greek word ‘nomos’ which is used to 
describe law or custom, and the biosphere, which suggests an enclosed environment in 
which particular investigations can be conducted.43 As a combination of these two 
notions, then, the nomosphere presents a cross-cut of social, political and legal activity 
that lends itself to analysis so that we may draw greater conclusions about how particular 
mechanisms function. However, an analysis of the ‘nomosphere’ might be difficult to 
conduct since we are generally participants in it.44 Our movements, choices, practice all 
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contribute to the sustaining of the ‘nomosphere’, and perhaps they can also contribute to 
its undoing. This premise is also shared by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos: assemblaging 
bodies have the capability to shift the course of the larger mechanisms of the lawscape 
and atmosphere. 
According to Delaney, the ‘nomosphere’ is a useful concept because it “successfully 
holds together the socio-spatial and the socio-legal while foregrounding the dynamic 
interplay of forms of social meaning and materiality; as these are implicated in the 
historical constitution of socio-relational power and situated, embodied experience.”45 
This concept sums up the main goals of Delaney’s theory, and it demonstrates that 
although there is an engagement with ‘spatialized’ concepts and physical materiality, the 
main point of the concept (and perhaps legal geography more broadly) is to engage with 
representation and identity (or subjective positioning) at the expense of the spatial. This 
project is significant in so far as it is important to identify and uncover forms of 
inequality and injustice within the social realm, however, it only shows one aspect of the 
potential engagement with spatiality. Furthermore, as I will argue throughout the thesis, 
an engagement with the non-human in a more purposeful way can open the possibility to 
new ethical positions, and thus, a more robust form of spatial justice, for human and 
nonhuman agents alike.  The first step forward is a deeper understanding of the co-
constiutivity of law and space.  
1.3.2 New Directions in Legal Geography 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulo is not alone in trying to incorporate the nonhuman or novel 
perspectives on the relationship between space, time and law. In this section, I discuss the 
work of Irus Braverman, Mariana Valverde and Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 
their perspective on space and materiality, and the role of politics in their analysis, 
especially in relation to nonhuman legal actors.  
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In a recent publication, David Delaney identifies a growing anxiety surrounding the 
parameters and the definition of the field of legal geography, and he confirms that legal 
geography should pay closer attention to “the world of other places beyond Western 
common law legal regimes; the world of the international; and the physical, other-than-
human worlds.”46 However, there is no indication in his summary as to how the 
methodology of legal geography will change to accommodate these new areas of inquiry, 
or even what challenges these fields might pose from a fundamental theoretical 
standpoint. 
Irus Braverman, who is interested in engaging with the nonhuman in a legal setting, 
identifies two main ideas that need to be further considered (or perhaps returned to) in 
discussions about legal geography: power and time.47 Her solution to the challenges 
posed by the presence of nonhuman actors in legal contexts is a renewed interest in 
pragmatism, and specifically, the benefits posed by an analysis that focuses on the idea of 
‘power with others’ rather than ‘power over others’.48 Braverman herself notes that there 
is an impact on how space can be thought:  
“Space figures [in relation to the nonhuman] in terms of traditional conceptions of 
place, landscape, and scale, for example, than as a way of approaching alterity, 
diversity, and multiplicity.”49  
Since the publication of The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography in 
2014, there has been an increased interest in the question of treatment of nonhuman or 
more-than-human actors within legal contexts.50 However, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
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is among the few legal scholars who have attempted to grapple with the theoretical and 
philosophical foundations of the relationship more purposefully.  
Mariana Valverde is another significant contributor to a discussion of the theoretical 
engagement with law and space although she approaches this question from the 
perspective of time in relation to the analysis of law and spatiality. In Chronotopes of 
Law: Jurisdiction, Scale, Governance, Valverde introduces the concept of a ‘legal 
chronotope’, which allows 
“us to explore how different legal times create or shape legal spaces, and vice 
versa: how the spatial location and spatial dynamics of legal processes in turn 
shape law’s times – how spatial dynamics thicken time.”51 
Valverde argues that it is important to consider “how temporalization affects 
spatialization and vice versa [as well as] how heterogeneous and even contradictory 
chronotopes coexist not only in a single literary (or legal) text but even within a single 
utterance.”52 The ‘chronotope’ takes many shapes: for example, as a legal setting, as a 
complex legal process, or as a figure that is caught in this process. It is merely used to 
describe the particular characteristics analyzed in space and time that might arise when a 
particular legal issue arises. For example, criminalizing marital rape assumes that the 
spouse is an autonomous person who engages in a transaction, and thus, is required to 
consent to taking part in that process.53 This particular example demonstrates how the 
chronotope of the family is impacted by the chronotope of the market (through the liberal 
subject). For Valverde, the productive moment of analysis occurs at the point of 
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interaction between space and time.54 The significant contribution of the legal chronotope 
is its emphasis on legal processes and systems rather than individual action. While 
individual ‘tactical decisions’ might drive the change in the legal process, the focus is on 
the operations of the system as a whole, rather than the intentionality or agency of the 
individual.55 This perspective is echoed in the discussion of spatial justice and the role of 
political agency, which will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this 
literature review.  
1.4  Spatial Justice and Posthumanism 
The influence of posthumanist thought on the relationship between law and space rests at 
the core of this next stage in the development of the concept of spatial justice. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, arguably, has crafted a posthumanist theory of justice 
through his work in Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, however he is not 
alone in attempting to think through the relationship between posthumanism and social 
justice.56 In this section, I will introduce a main influence on Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ thought, Karen Barad’s theory of a posthuman performativity, and then I 
will move into a description of some of the more salient concepts that are put forward in 
Spatial Justice, specifically in relation to law and spatiality.  
In her seminal article, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How 
Matter Comes to Matter,” Karen Barad argues for a shift from  
“questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality (e.g., do they 
mirror nature or culture?) to matters of practices/doings/actions [because they] 
bring to the forefront important questions of ontology, materiality, and agency, 
while social constructivist approaches get caught up in the geometrical optics of 
reflection where, much like the infinite play of images between two facing 
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mirrors, the epistemological gets bounced back and forth, but nothing more is 
seen.”57 
Barad builds on the writings of critical social and political theorists, like Michel Foucault 
and Judith Butler to consider “how the body’s materiality – for example, its anatomy and 
physiology – and other material forces actively matter to the processes of 
materialization.”58 She is concerned with the ways in which power operates through 
materiality, taking into consideration matter’s agential capability in this process, and, 
raising an argument for a more purposeful engagement with the materiality of discursive 
analysis.59 Drawing on the performative nature of discourse, Barad argues that  
“Matter, like meaning, is not an individually articulated or static entity. Matter is 
not little bits of nature, or a blank slate, surface, or site passively awaiting 
signification; nor is it an uncontested ground for scientific, feminist, or Marxist 
theories. Matter is not a support, location, referent, or source of sustainability for 
discourse. Matter is not immutable or passive. It does not require the mark of an 
external force like culture or history to complete it. Matter is always already an 
ongoing historicity.”60 
Barad presents us with an analysis of material agency beyond social spatiality. Against 
Delaney’s interpretation of Barad’s work, then, the material engagements and spatial 
frameworks may be attributed to a material-discursive analysis in accordance with 
Foucault or Butler’s ‘social constructivist’ perspectives, but it need not stop there.61 
However, by shifting the discussion away from the social, have we also shifted the 
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discussion away from the political? What implications does this hold for spatial justice as 
social justice? 
As I noted in the earlier sections, the idea of spatial justice was introduced as a 
way to theorize social injustice and inequality in a capitalist system, and more 
specifically, in an urban setting. It served a dual purpose by exposing the ways in which 
social and economic inequality affected marginalized communities, and by providing the 
language and framework through which activist work could be spatially situated. 
Therefore, from its incipient stages, spatial justice was a politically-oriented legal 
concept. Legal geography continued the analysis of law and space through a social justice 
lens. However, these approaches are both theoretically (and ultimately practically) 
ineffective because they do not address the constitutive premises of legal relationships 
from a materialist perspective. Rather, as a reflection of social injustice, the concept only 
serves to uncover an alternative perspective of a legal context, but it is often unsuccessful 
in dismantling the system that gave rise to those oppositions. Following Barad and 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, I argue that a more purposeful engagement with 
materiality and the nonhuman can provide insight into addressing the shortcomings of 
social justice analyses.  
1.4.1 What is (Posthuman) Spatial Justice? 
Spatial justice is produced through a rupture at the level of the lawscape. The 
lawscape is defined by movement and embodiment. It is both material and discursive, 
and unlike the atmosphere, it is mutable. The lawscape is made up of the physical, 
material world and the bodies that move within it, the rules and regulations that shape 
them, and anything in-between, including affect, emotion, unknown materials, etc. A 
fixed or situated representation of the lawscape results in an atmosphere, thick with 
discourse, yet sufficiently diffuse to envelop large systems and assemblages. A key 
characteristic of atmosphere is its ability to dissimulate the mechanisms through which it 
functions.62  
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The lawscape is the site where conflicts and displacements unfold, and a rupture 
or reorientation of the lawscape can produce a possibility of spatial justice. However, the 
rupture that opens up the possibility for spatial justice must reverberate through multiple 
lawscapes and eventually through the atmosphere in order for change (reorientation) to 
result in spatial justice.63 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos explains that spatial justice 
occurs when the ruptured lawscape engages in a lawscaping process that hinges on 
repetition and disruption of other lawscapes.64 Lawscapes can turn into atmospheres and 
vice versa.65 There is a constant motion at play here which captures the movement of 
bodies, and the tilting of the continuum.66  
As mentioned earlier, spatial justice distances itself from the ‘distributive’ nature 
of the idea of social justice in order to frame a more fluid understanding of the legal 
subject. Or precisely because there is ‘no outside to law,’ by thinking through spatial 
justice we are able to understand how legal assemblages and bodies are more effective 
means of capturing our relationship to our legal surroundings that the legal subjective 
lens. The impact of spatial justice is palpable and shattering, as it leads to a reframing of 
the lawscape within which bodies (or assemblages) operate.  
However, I believe that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos encounters difficulty 
framing the political dimension of spatial justice because it cannot be conceptualized as 
will flowing from a legal subject. In line with legal geographical thinking, his analysis 
demonstrates a vested interest in revealing the mutually constitutive relationship between 
law and spatiality, however, this is achieved at the expense of ‘politics’ because politics 
has been framed with the human subject at its core. He explains as follows,  
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“The problem with the above analyses – and in full awareness of an arguably 
unjust generalization – is that the spatial remains an adjectival context, a 
background against which considerations of the surrounding space are thrown into 
relief with the ‘obscured spatiality of all aspects of social life.’ Society is 
reinstated in its primacy, the human subject never abandons his enlightened 
central perspective, and the usual rationalizing political processes are applied 
even if presented in their revolutionary variation…”67 
Legal geographers have carefully analyzed specific legal relationships in order to show 
how it is that spatial dynamics play a role in maintaining particular power relations, and 
shaping these legal subjects. The political dimensions of these legal subjective positions 
are much more evident because the positionality is fairly uncontested once identified. 
What I mean to say is that although we are made aware of the conflicts and power 
relations that may arise in particular legal contexts, we are not asked to challenge the 
framing of legal subjectivity outright, we are merely presented with its opposite, or its 
‘other’. One of the reasons for this kind of approach is based on the fact that legal 
geographers’ projects align themselves closer to social justice discourse and legal 
practice, and a particularly humanist perspective. Again, this approach aspires to be 
inclusionary by extending the same types of rights to others, without contesting the 
grounding or definition of those rights, and oftentimes, their necessary reliance on that 
exclusivity. The potential for a more radical understanding of the issues at the heart of 
these spatial dynamics is lost if we do not push the limits of the legal subject. This 
proposition in turn demands a novel investigation of the role of materiality and the 
political in our understanding of spatial justice. By framing legal subjectivity through the 
lens of spatial justice and legal assemblages, we are able to grasp a new ethical position 
which may have lasting implications for human rights discourses. This ethical position is 
borrowed from posthumanist theory, and it is described as the ‘responsibility of 
indistinction’; it is informed by Karen Barad’s concept of ‘agential separability’. I will 
introduce this concept properly in the section on agency and political practice. 
Spatial justice does not necessarily guarantee a solution to the various problems 
that arise in law (or the societies it frames). It poses a problem or a question, and 
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contributes to a constant analysis of the current structures that define our existence, in 
hopes that it can reorient the discussion, and shift some fundamental aspect of our legal 
(and arguably social and political organization). As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
explains,  
“At the same time however, the concept is aware of its limitations. 
Epistemologically, it can never do away with the incommunicability between 
epistemes. Ontologically, and in the same vein, it can never be the solution. 
Spatial justice cannot bring about better identities, more organized popular will, 
broader consensus, healthier or richer developing countries. Nor can it do away 
with time and its fundamental role in conceptualisations of justice. In fact, it 
specifically does not attempt to do the latter. Instead, it simply posits a shift of 
emphasis, and a temporary one at that. The best it can hope to do is delineate the 
problem, initiate a discussion on the conditions, acknowledge the hitherto 
marginalized spatial factor: in short, while acknowledging and working through 
the impossibility of a solution, spatial justice brings forth the conditions of such 
and impossibility, thereby allowing a flicker of possibility to stream through.”68 
Although movement lawyers, or per Delaney, nomospheric technicians, would have a 
tough time accepting this idea of justice, they would also be able to recognize uncertainty 
as a fundamental aspect of their everyday work. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is 
describing an inherently political problem when he talks about the ‘incommunicability 
between epistemes’. Politics cannot be reduced only to identities and conflict between 
them, but rather the negotiation of those spaces of everyday life, and the material-
discursive processes that give rise to these identities. In fact, Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos clarifies his intention as follows,  
“This is the challenge of spatial justice: to negotiate a contested space without 
taking recourse to origins, central commands, outlines. To be thrown into the 
mobile multiplicity of the grass is to follow the blades waving in the wind: spatial 
justice is required to understand bodies as posthuman assemblages, that is with 
their political, personal, legal, religious, technological elements, moving on a 
continuum of differentiated power relations.”69 
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Although we are presented with a different political process, we are presented with a 
political process nonetheless, and it is important to investigate how we can consider a 
performance, or practice, of spatial justice.  
1.4.2 Rupturing the Continuum: The Politics of Spatial Justice 
In order to think about the political implications of spatial justice, we have to 
address the shift in thinking in terms of legal subjectivity and political agency to thinking 
about assemblages and lively agency. By eschewing the idea of the legal subject, and 
replacing it with the notion of assemblage or situated collectivity, we are able to think 
more dynamically about the implications of our bodies in relation to other bodies (human 
or nonhuman). This perspective allows us to understand how nonhuman entities are 
actively implicated in our social and political existence. This approach does not intend to 
imbue material space with vitality or to anthropomorphize objects; rather, it aims to 
demonstrate that these bodies maintain and contribute to a political framework. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos invokes the assemblage as a framework through which we 
can understand interactions between different participants on a continuum in order to 
allow us to see the networked and complex interactivity between bodies on that 
continuum.  
By removing politics from the discussion, he is not suggesting that the possibility 
of a type of politics is not present in the interactions between human and nonhuman 
bodies, rather, he is suggesting that the notion of political agency has changed because 
the individual is not exercising political will in a traditional subjective sense. For this 
reason, he approaches this discussion through the lens of agency. It is understandable that 
this position will seem strange, in particular to legal geographers, who are attempting to 
work new subjective categories (animals, environment, artificial intelligence, microbes, 
trees, etc) into an already-established framework of rights discourses. However, thinking 
about political agency beyond the human, or restricted categories that are formulated in 
relation to the human, complicates the situation when we want to invoke the idea of 
social justice in relation to spatiality and materiality.  
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Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is attempting something quite brave for legal 
theory, which is to help us grasp our fundamental vulnerability in the world, and to give 
us an opportunity to think that position in a legal context. He has to do this by taking the 
human-centred legal subject off its pedestal, and propose a novel approach to its re-
construction. This approach becomes increasingly interesting in light of the introduction 
of new tech to facilitate governance and essentially alter the basis of human interaction.  
1.4.3 Lively Agencies and the Assemblage 
Lively agency is a form of agential capability that is not centered on the human (or 
the nonhuman); it does not attempt to reformulate hierarchies between animate and 
inanimate bodies, but rather, according to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, it addresses the 
single, defining characteristic of all bodies, which is their singularity (i.e. a conative 
withdrawal).70 
Lively agency is informed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s theories on bodies 
and assemblages, Graham Harman’s notion of ontological withdrawal, and to a more 
limited extent Michel Foucault’s biopolitics. Lively agency is defined as “the ability of 
bodies (animate and inanimate) to withdraw in their singularity while connecting to other 
bodies.”71 This form of agency can only emerge within the space of the law because it 
acts as the “vessel through which the law emerges, since each body is responsible for its 
position in relation to the wider assemblage.”72 
 The assemblages shifting and moving through the lawscape provide the flexibility 
and adaptability necessary to recognize the pressure of particular power relations. This 
kind of approach differs from that of legal geographers because it is not reliant on the 
dialectical oppressor/oppressed binary and the spatial context that sustains the legal 
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violence which gives rise to this relationship. However, this does not mean that resistance 
and agency are not present in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s work. In fact, I believe his 
theory presents a more politically relevant relationship because it relies on encounter, and 
negotiation, rather than origin and causality.73 However, in that process it does not 
attempt to obscure the reality of power relations, nor the fact that some bodies have a 
greater ability to influence the movement and direction of the assemblage.74 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos also draws our attention to the failure of these 
processes to be perpetually open towards their vulnerability to cooptation. He notes the 
following with respect to assemblages and the potential of rhizomatic thinking,  
“[h]owever, rhizomes have been routinely fetishized in the literature as the way to 
guarantee openness, flexibility, flatness and contingency. But rhizomes are also 
co-opted, overcoded and used in ways that go against the very idea of rhizome. 
Received legal histories, prefabricated political positions, historical origins and 
facts that have been maintained as affects of spatial and temporal nostalgia or 
claims for reterritorialization make use of rhizomes and their affective way of 
spreading. We are all encased in atmospherics of legal and political engineering 
which spread imitatively, rhizomatically. The space in the middle is not always 
open and possible. It often succumbs to the rhizomatics of atmospheres. This is 
the struggle: the middle is neither necessarily ‘good’ nor ‘bad’, positive or 
negative. In its point of folding, the tilting surface gathers speed, becomes 
vertiginous, with bodies sucked in or centripetally deracinated. It is not an easy 
space to be in, and no readily available moral hook is there to orient us.”75 
The capabilities of the assemblage demonstrate that these spaces are vulnerable to 
cooptation, which in a sense, acknowledges the uncertainty of politics, even though there 
is a risk of harmful outcomes.  
1.4.4 Lively Agencies and the Responsibility of Indistinction 
Lively agency is not agential in the sense that it initiates action, but rather because it 
opens itself up to the possibility of being “acted upon” by ‘a life’ (i.e. a virtual and not 
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yet actualized form of agency).76 This ability is made possible through the assemblage 
because it fosters both actualized and virtual bodies through its perpetual moving and 
shifting borders. This ability also permits a different understanding of responsibility: a 
responsibility of indistinction.  
However, there is no guarantee of openness, rather the ‘ability to be acted upon’ is 
premised on the notion that all bodies tend towards a conative withdrawal. And, because 
these shifts are taking place within assemblage formations, then those bodies are 
displacing other bodies as they retract. They are also responding to their conative desire, 
but they are also producing something through that relation.77 They actualize, but never 
reveal themselves as full objects.  
The continuum, “a tilted, power-structured surface, on which bodies move, rest and 
position themselves, affecting the tilt while being affected by it,”78 is differentiated 
through ruptures that arise out of a process of folding. The continuum folds into itself 
(through the process of withdrawal), and as such creates temporary distinctions. The 
bodies that move on this continuum are assemblages, premised on relations and entering 
in relations with other bodies/assemblages. Although these assemblages are inherently 
amoral, the bodies within have a choice with respect to how they position themselves in 
relation to other bodies.79 The tilt on the continuum is achieved because of the ‘weight’ 
or ‘power’ of an assemblage (human or nonhuman).80 He states,  
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“one can organize one’s own body (itself an assemblage, namely a collectivity) in 
relation to the rest of the assemblage, in its turn in relation to the world. Each 
assemblage is a lawscape, and the lawscape keeps moving.”81 
He names this process withdrawal, or the responsibility of indistinction. It is achieved 
because of our inherently entangled collectivity, and the fact that we bear a degree of 
responsibility towards each other as a result of this entanglement.82 This situated 
responsibility captures the fine line between understanding that we may not have 
complete control over the movement of certain assemblages (especially very powerful 
ones, like large corporations or natural disasters), and that we are not absolved of 
responsibility simply because we might not have control over these greater structures.83  
1.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this literature review was to demonstrate that spatial justice is not 
an apolitical project, but rather that it attempts to frame an alternative view of politics in 
order to distance itself from its humanist roots. Through spatial justice we are presented 
with a material, embedded and contingent form of legal and political existence. A 
continuum brims with activity because of the political nature of the assemblages that are 
constantly moving and shifting as a result of the power relations that unfold within. 
However, those power relations are not necessarily hinged on human-human relations, 
but through a mutual conative desire to persist, these struggles can emerge between all 
kinds of bodies. Therefore, the mutual co-constitutivity of law and space maintains a 
political dimension at its core.  
The next chapter will present a more pointed argument for the political dimension 
of spatial justice and argue for a performative practice of spatial justice, in order to 
provide an indication of what political activism and social justice lawyering may look 
like.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Performative Assemblages and Spatial Justice 
2.1 Introduction 
In the following chapter I argue that politics remains a central aspect of the concept of 
spatial justice, and that the mutual constitutivity of law and space relies on a 
performativity, albeit a posthuman one.  In order for the lawscape to be reoriented, and 
open up the possibility of spatial justice, the assemblaging bodies of the lawscape engage 
in a performance of spatial justice. 
The mutual constitutivity of law and spatiality reflects the significance of law in everyday 
life in a manner that acknowledges it as a simultaneously abstract and material concept. 
This approach to legal theory is important not only because it uncovers the pervasive 
presence (and violence) of the law, but also because it reveals the complicated nature of 
the distinction between the legal and the political in conventional legal practice. For 
example, the fact that we categorize lawyers who advocate for social justice as ‘political 
lawyers’ speaks to this deeply problematic representation of law and politics, and the 
need to delimit the legal and the political then becomes a tool for rendering power 
relations invisible.  
According to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, spatial justice emerges through a rupture (or 
reorientation) of the lawscape which is produced by the spatial negotiations of the 
assemblages that move across the surface of the continuum that sustains the lawscape. 
Although these bodies may have particular tendencies based on their placement within 
the lawscape, they are responsive to the collective nature of the assemblages with which 
they engage. This responsiveness speaks to bodies’ ability to shift and change depending 
on the situation, which can be beneficial or detrimental to the greater assemblage.  
By acknowledging the double articulation between law and space, we also begin to see 
how the field can be influenced from the outside in a much more effective and coherent 
way. Although Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos claims that there is no outside to law, that is 
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merely a commentary on the fact that law is everywhere; however, this does not mean 
that politics is no longer a necessary constitutive aspect of how law and space co-emerge. 
Therefore, the relationship between interior/exterior (or closure and openness) becomes a 
central concern to this theory. I argue that in order to understand the political implications 
of spatial justice we need to engage with Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ 
conceptualization of the outside.  
Unlike the legal geographers, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos frames the co-constitutivity 
of law and space as a concept that blurs disciplinary boundaries, allowing us to 
understand how seemingly non-legal actions can bear deep legal implications. I want to 
use this opportunity to suggest that, in this sense, spatial justice provides an opportunity 
to think about how political issues can shift legal discourses in very effective ways by 
actively engaging with their environments in different ways. Simultaneously, it suggests 
that shifts in our environments, whether prompted through human or nonhuman action, 
could have lasting implications on our legal and political landscape.  
In order to establish this position, I read Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ complex 
theoretical perspective closer to the texts that inform it, specifically those of Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, despite the fact that he distances himself from these theories. 
The influence of these two French thinkers is present through the use of concepts like the 
fold, reorientation, rupture and immanence. I argue that a Deleuzo-Guattarian political 
ontology is present in the concept of spatial justice, and that it emerges through the idea 
of the co-constitutivity of law and space in the lawscape. I will propose that performing 
spatial justice depends on the political activity of assemblages comprised of both human 
and nonhuman agents. 
This chapter is divided into three sections which are centered on Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ main concepts: (1) The Lawscape: A Mutual Constitutivity of Law and 
Space; (2) Withdrawal: Monadic Bodies, Assemblages, and Lively Agencies; and (3) 
Performing Spatial Justice: Assemblages and the Reorientation of the Lawscape. 
Although I will address the influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing throughout, the 
main analysis of their writing will take place in the two sections. The second section will 
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investigate the posthuman legal subjectivity and agency envisioned by Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, and its political implications. Finally, the third section will introduce what 
I believe to be the practice of spatial justice, namely how bodies perform spatial justice, 
and it will argue for the need to recognize political thought and agency alongside the law. 
2.2    The Lawscape: The Mutual Constitutivity of Law and 
Space 
As I mentioned in the first chapter, the mutual constitutivity of law and space is a concept 
which emerged, at least within contemporary theoretical discourse, in the writings of 
legal geographers in the 1980s and 1990s. This relationship between law and space can 
provide insight into how it is that we can begin to re-conceptualize legal subjectivity and 
agential capability. Yet, in order to engage with this project from a legal and 
philosophical perspective, and to be able to consider the agential capabilities of the non-
human, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos distances himself from the social and political 
space of the legal geographers, eventually arguing that law “kills politics.”84  
2.2.1 David Delaney on the Mutual Constitutivity of Law and Space 
The mutual constitutivity of law and space is defined by legal geographers as the way in 
which law influences social space, and in turn, how social spaces affect the laws that are 
required to contain and define these spaces.85 David Delaney presents the close link 
between these two seemingly disparate disciplines as a practice of “world-making.”86 The 
objective of these projects is to investigate the ways in which a trans-disciplinary analysis 
can serve to uncover new meanings and practices within these legal spaces and 
specifically with respect to the bodies that enact them.87  
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Influenced by Henri Lefebvre’s work on the production of space, legal geographers view 
law as productive of social space and vice versa. However, the significance of Lefebvre’s 
work rests in how it is that he sets up the “socio-spatial dialectic,” and the way that space 
is viewed as a more significant actor.88 Arguably, this engagement sets his work apart, 
even from legal geographers. In his seminal work, Production of Space, Lefebvre applies 
a Marxist analysis to demonstrate how cities are shaped by the social relations of those 
who inhabit them, and how these in turn solidify and reproduce these relationships. To 
Lefebvre these processes are mutually productive, and the notion of social space and the 
performance of social space in a capitalist system stems from his thinking.  
However, due to a focus on the social and political significance of this analysis, legal 
geographers seek a better sense of how space and matter could be represented through 
these processes. In an effort to bridge this gap, Delaney proposes the concept of 
‘nomoscape’ which he describes as follows: 
“Nomoscapes may most intuitively be thought of as nomic landscapes. But…these 
are not simply occupied (as we might imagine figures in a landscape), they are lived. 
They are continually enacted through engaged, situated human activity. The practical 
organization of nomoscapes strongly conditions how people move through their 
worlds. They determine what lines we encounter, cross, or refrain from crossing; 
what consequences follow from our crossings; how we are differentially positioned 
and repositioned with respect to nomic fields of power.”89  
Therefore, the nomoscape is a landscape formed of different interrelated or overlapping 
settings, each with its own specific characteristics and power dynamics which are 
sustained through law and space.90 Delaney informs us early on that these spaces are 
performed, and the legal subjects who move within (or perhaps, through) these spaces, 
are produced by these spaces, as they in turn produce these spaces. This perspective on 
law and spatiality is informed by a variety of theoretical sources, but Karen Barad theory 
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of posthuman performativitiy influences Delaney’s analysis, and in a sense, brings him 
closer to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ work.   
This theoretical framework becomes instrumental in understanding how spaces are 
employed to produce and advance legal forms of violence and inequality. Legal 
geographers then attempt to uncover, articulate and analyze the relationship between law 
and space from this perspective. However, this analysis operates largely at the level of the 
epistemological and representational. The legal subjects who are enacted through the 
performative processes of these legal spaces seem to become trapped within the logic of 
these spaces and the oppressor/oppressed binary. Therefore, while the legal geographers 
allow us to understand the operations of power through the production of these legal 
spaces, they are not able to capture the fullness of the performative subjects that inhabit 
the nomoscape beyond their identity in relation to that space, or the dynamic between 
themselves, and usually, the state as an oppressive mechanism. This point is further 
evidenced in the fact that, ultimately, the site of agential privilege is held by Delaney’s 
nomospheric technicians, or ‘political’ lawyers, as they operate at the border between 
oppressors and oppressed to resolve conflicts.  
2.2.2 Doreen Massey on Political Space 
A main challenge for thinkers of space has been the collapsing of the spatial and 
material into the textual.91 Doreen Massey developed a theory of spatiality, drawing in 
part on a Deleuzo-Guattarian becoming, that challenges conventional understandings of 
the ‘production of space’ because they undergo the risk of rendering space as static and 
measurable, or representational.92  Instead, she proposes an understanding of space as 
activity: 
“For if scientific/intellectual activity is indeed to be understood as an active and 
productive engagement in/of the world it is none the less a particular kind of practice, 
a specific form of engagement/production in which it is hard to deny (to absolve 
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ourselves from the responsibility for?) any element of representation (see also Latour, 
1999b; Stengers, 1997), even if it is, quite certainly, productive and experimental 
rather than simply mimetic, and an embodied knowledge rather than a mediation. It 
does not however have to be conceived of as producing a space, nor its characteristics 
carried over to inflect our implicit imaginations of space. For to do so is to rob place 
of those characteristics of freedom (Bergson), dislocation (Laclau) and surprise (de 
Certeau) which are essential to open it up to the political.”93 
While the idea of the performativity of space might seem to bring Doreen Massey in line 
with the work of the legal geographers, she argues against thinking a multiplicity of 
perspectives that open up space to plurality in the sense of categories, but rather, for a 
view of a multiplicity which keeps alive the possibility of new trajectories for those who 
engage in these spatial processes. She urges us to adopt a theory of spatiality that 
recognizes becoming as the necessary condition of life, and that becoming is always 
with.94  
She uses the concept of throwntogetherness to capture these spatio-temporal 
processes: 
“but what is special about place is not some romance of a pre-given collective 
identity or of the eternity of the hills. Rather, what is special about place is 
precisely that throwntogetherness, the unavoidable challenge of negotiating a 
here-and-now (itself drawing on a history and a geography of thens and theres); 
and a negotiation which must take place within and between both human and 
nonhuman…This is the event of place.”95  
Therefore, Massey sets us up for a thinking of space as open, processual and grounded in 
the negotiations of bodies, all with the desire to keep open the possibility of thinking the 
political.  
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2.2.3 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos on the Lawscape 
In “And for Law: Why Space Cannot be Understood Without Law” Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos mounts a critique of Massey’s work based primarily on the idea that her 
writing fails to capture the inherent relationship between law and space.96 The main 
critique rests in the fact that law is understood only as positivist, doctrinal, and inflexible, 
which are the main critiques Massey (and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos) apply to 
conventional theorizations of space.97 However, there is a fundamental distinction in how 
they theorize law and space out of their representational prisons, namely that Massey 
turns to a positivity inherent in space, and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos finds himself 
having to capture the negativity of law.98 I argue that in order to think through the 
potential of the mutual constitutivity of law and space we need to address this tension 
between Massey’s open and affirmative politics and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ 
closed and auto-poietic law because it impacts the role of politics at the heart of an 
analysis of law and space.  
In framing this tension, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos re-affirms a very particular, yet 
conventional, relationship between politics and law: 
“Law operates through rupture and exclusion as a matter of course. One of the things 
that law ruptures and fragments is reality. The various narratives of the people who 
come to or are called by the law, are submitted to a process of legal analysis and 
indeed fragmentation, excluding irrelevant facts and retaining only the ones that can 
be converted into legally ingestible bites. For this reason, law habitually excludes 
politics. This initially might appear counter-intuitive, but it is important to understand 
that law is not politics…but the idea of exclusion of politics from law is an integral 
part of the legal identity. In a universally and equitably applied law, political biases 
are just that and must be avoided if the desired impression of neutrality and 
objectivity of the law is to remain beyond approach…Law must remain apolitical if it 
is to retain (the allure of) objectivity.”99 
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In response to this statement, I argue that the process through which law excludes politics 
is in and of itself political, and furthermore, it is by understanding the materiality of the 
mutual constitutivity of law and space that we are made aware of this fact. Material and 
spatial practice reveals the implications and negotiations that stem from the ‘universal’ 
and abstract application of the law. Therefore, on one hand, politics cannot be cast into 
the shadows of legal practice, and on the other hand, politics cannot be reduced to a 
rudimentary understanding of identity politics and representation, or ‘political bias’. The 
significance of understanding the relationship between law and space through a 
performative lens is that it recognizes flexible and shifting identity positions of the bodies 
that are affected by it through an engagement with materiality. Therefore, in order to 
recognize the limitations of the law, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos accepts the basic 
operational nature of law as a tendency towards closure.  
2.2.4 Lawscape, Body, and Political Agency 
The mutual constitutivity of law and space is marked by the concept of the lawscape in 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theoretical universe. The lawscape is the outcome of the 
co-emergence of law and space, and it is formed through the interactions between the 
material world, the environment and the bodies (assemblages) that move across its 
continuum. The lawscape is vibrant and continuous, while also perpetually ruptured, and 
vulnerable to reorientation. This fact is meant to reflect the dynamic nature of the 
lawscape, and to distinguish it from the engineered atmospheres that operate through 
diffuse and yet suffocating and constrictive laws.100 The lawscape is ontologically 
negative and reliant on closure, however, because it is material and produced through the 
folding and unfolding of the continuum (space), “it accepts negativity within a much 
ampler, positive plenitude.”101 
This seemingly fraught dynamic between openness and closure plays a significant role in 
shaping the ontological premises of the bodies and assemblages that emerge within these 
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lines, and thus, is significant to an understanding of agency and subjectivity within this 
legal framework. In the following section, I will address how Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos understands the body and its agential capabilities. This will bring us one 
step closer to thinking about the performance of spatial justice.  
2.3 Withdrawal, Monadic Bodies and Assemblages 
The theoretical thought of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari has a significant influence 
on the concepts of spatial justice and the lawscape. Concepts like folding, immanence 
and reorientation, which are oftentimes used in framing this theoretical perspective on 
law and justice, are drawn from the writings of these two French philosophers, as well as 
the political ontology that they crafted through their collaborations. Although 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has explicitly stated that his theories are not exclusively 
Deleuzo-Guattarian, I believe that there are sufficient theoretical overlap to allow us to 
craft a theory of political agency within spatial justice and the lawscape by taking a closer 
look at this relationship.102 
As I noted in the earlier section, a noteworthy distinguishing factor between 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ writing and that of Deleuze and Guattari revolves around 
the question of closure, and the desire to understand the negativity of the law without 
capitulating to the openness that is typically attributed to the writings of Deleuze and 
Guattari. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos wants to develop a theory of law and justice that 
is capable of explaining this fundamental characteristic of law, while at the same time, 
working towards recognizing the embeddedness and contingency of legal practice. I 
argue that if we want to think of the relationship between law and spatiality, and a 
material justice, then we have to address the question of the political.  
I begin with an overview of the concepts of fold and orientation in the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari because they are significant to the ways in which Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos understands the body and agency. Then I will address the concept of 
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withdrawal and the assemblage, and I will conclude this section with the concept of a 
‘responsibility of indistinction’ which demonstrates how we may think through the 
concept of spatial justice from a political perspective.  
2.3.1 Fold and Orientation 
The ‘fold’ offers “an at once abstract and tactile sense of matter…at the crux of any 
social practice.”103 As a monadic thinker, Deleuze is interested in the interior/exterior 
dynamic present in the process of unfolding, and the new conceptualization of 
subjectivity that this process entails.104 Following Leibniz’s thinking on continuums and 
folds, Deleuze explains that “a fold is always folded within a fold,” and that “unfolding is 
thus not the contrary of folding, but follows the fold up to the following fold.”105 Thus, 
the process of unfolding is creative and generative, “whereas to fold is to diminish…‘to 
withdraw into the recesses of a world.’”106 Unfolding is a process whereby the body (or 
the monad) is exposed to the outside (or exteriority), and as such it engages in a process 
of proliferation and redefinition. However, as Deleuze indicates, a simultaneous process 
of folding results in a productive withdrawal, since to withdraw into the ‘recesses of a 
world’ suggests the possible creation of a world into which the body may withdraw. I 
posit that this interpretation is close to the notion of withdrawal suggested by 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos.  
The movement inherent in the processes of folding and unfolding is noted in various 
ways in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schitzophrenia, through the process of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. In order to understand how the lawscape can 
be reoriented, it is useful to understand how it is that Deleuze and Guattari treat the 
concept of place and spatiality, which relates to these de/reterritorializations. Nomadic 
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space is conceptualized as a “nonlimited locality,”107 namely a space which is not 
traversed linearly, from point A to point B, but rather through a process of constant 
readjustment and reorientation.108 The idea of nomadic space (or smooth space) brings to 
the fore the significance of orientation: “the local operations of relay must be oriented by 
the discovery (and often the continual rediscovery) of direction; otherwise, these 
operations would be in vain.”109 Therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari, the ontological and 
epistemological are indivisible, or as pithily stated by Ed Casey: “that where something is 
situated has everything to do with how it is structured.”110 Casey further explains that the 
figures that move through ‘smooth’ space engage the idea of “place-as-region”111 which 
projects the body as capable of “existing through the entire region.”112 Therefore, the 
body, as conceived by Deleuze and Guattari, breaks with the “bilaterality” inherent in an 
orientation in Cartesian space, acknowledging that orientation can be accomplished 
through “actions at ‘close range’….[and yet, that] there is a ‘contiguity’ with the ground 
one is on.”113 Evidently, not all bodies are capable of engaging in these particular spatial 
processes as the world is generally formed of both smooth and striated spaces; however, 
the ability to engage in movement between these spaces gives us an idea of what kind of 
action might be required to reorient the lawscape. 
The distinct contribution of Deleuze’s thought to the question of subjectivity is centered 
on the idea of situatedness or localization, but it is framed in such a way so as to eschew 
the necessity of permanent emplacement by promoting the idea of negotiation and 
regeneration. The foundational premise of the Deleuzo-Guattarian subject is movement, 
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and as such, we begin to understand the event as a significant element in shaping the 
subject. This concept should have lasting implications for legal subjectivity as well (as 
political subjectivity), and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos presents us with a theory that 
speaks to these implications. Therefore, the fold as the “reduction of variables to a ‘single 
and unique variability’ of the touching or tangent curve”114 allows us to understand how 
the distinct character of each body can be simultaneously localized and abstract (or 
universal). According to Deleuze, this process is accomplished through the envelopment 
or “inhesion” that is facilitated by the fold.115 Leibniz defines the monad as the “unity 
that envelops multiplicity.”116 It is the ‘point of view’ that encapsulates an entire world, 
but only expresses a particular part of it.117 He describes the process of creating the fold 
as a torsion between the world and the soul (or the subject), highlighting an indistinction 
at the heart of the production of monadic bodies. 
2.3.1.1 Folding and Unfolding in the Lawscape 
The processes of folding and orientation provide a direction for the political project at the 
heart of this theory of spatial justice. The fold is both the metaphorical and material 
(virtual and real) manifestation of withdrawal. It gives shape to the assemblages or bodies 
that form within the continuum of the lawscape, and thus, the process of folding (or 
rather unfolding) has a significant influence on the ways in which the lawscape can be 
reoriented. 
The lawscape is defined as “the way the ontological tautology between law and space 
unfolds as difference.”118 This definition reflects the dynamism and movement of law, as 
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well as a constitutive tension or conflict. The lawscape is the ‘place’ where the material 
and immaterial dimensions of law meet, and it marks the site where bodies fold and 
unfold into existence. The lawscape is simultaneously dynamic and situated; it can be 
changed and reoriented, and yet, it also reflects the stability and shape of legal bodies. 
The lawscape incorporates both an epistemological dimension, as it expresses 
differentiation between bodies, and captures their presence (whether visible or invisible) 
in the moment of rupture, and, it also incorporates ontological characteristics, as a 
continuum that reflects indistinction and the possible emergence of bodies. This is the 
crux of the onto-epistemological theory that is central to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ 
project, the emergence and withdrawal of bodies. The lawscape is like the ‘place-region’ 
because “the law in the lawscape emanates from every body without any origin.”119 
2.3.1.2 (Un)folding and Withdrawal 
The processes of folding and unfolding that are taking place through the continuum and 
within the lawscape contribute to an ontological withdrawal, which is central to 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice. This particular theorization of 
withdrawal is influenced by Graham Harman’s definition of the concept. Harman argues 
that objects constantly withdraw into an “infinite recess” and as they do, they leave 
behind ‘qualities’ and ‘notes’ that are meant to reflect that sensual and cultural 
characteristics of these objects, respectively.120 Harman’s withdrawal refers to a 
productive interiority, an inner world or something akin to an unconscious at the level of 
matter. The object of object-oriented ontology is properly out of reach, cannot be 
‘known’, and rather, all we ‘know’ are these ‘qualities’ and ‘notes’ the objects leave 
behind.  
As I mentioned above, Deleuze understands withdrawal as a movement towards the 
‘recesses of a world’. It is a description that leaves us with the image of a very particular 
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representation of a narrowly understood and specific world. Therefore, although this is a 
creative process, it is also suggestive of closure and definition. The unsettling or catalyst 
for a creative process however seems to have a different source for Deleuze and Guattari 
and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, one privileging openness and the other closure, or 
self-destruction/self-overcoming (Nietzsche) and self-preservation (Spinoza).121 Yet, 
when we look closer at Deleuze’s theory, and we consider the role of the fold, we 
immediately understand that the processes of deterritorialization (which produce the 
openness that defines Deleuze’s writing) are not necessarily linked to an interiority or 
exteriority, rather they operate at the border, the skin, or strata of the fold. I argue that the 
question of openness versus closure sets up a false theoretical binary, and that it is the 
process and movement that bears more significance to the onto-epistemological 
production of bodies and subjectivities. A return to the material conditions through which 
these bodies are performed provides some insight into how this relationship can be 
overcome. 
This spatial and material dimension of justice allows us to break through the image of the 
legal body as an individual unit, and to think of it in terms of its relations, its processes of 
formation (both ontological and epistemological), and ultimately its  ecolonizatio. 
Through this theory of justice we are able to understand the material context that sustains 
these social, political and legal interactions, especially because we can no longer ignore 
our presence within this world. It captures the socio-political context and the material 
context, and as such, the theory of spatial justice and the responsibility of indistinction 
create a very useful vehicle for thinking about law and justice. As Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos reminds us: “only from within matter can law control.”122 
2.3.2 Withdrawal and Assemblage 
Withdrawal, as conceptualized by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, is premised on bodies’ 
engagement in a negotiation of space, and their subsequent emergence. In this sense, 
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withdrawal (as a form of becoming) allows us to see a political ontology emerging across 
the lawscape. These withdrawing bodies (or legal assemblages) are operating in a mix of 
human/nonhuman relations, indeed challenging traditional legal definitions of agency, 
and yet, engaging in spatio-legal practices that are properly understood to be political. In 
order to consider the future of political and legal thought, it is important to look closely at 
how these ‘lively agencies’ and assemblages operate.  
The bodies that form on the continuum of the lawscape are assemblages, defined by their 
relationships and the productive contexts, rather than their characteristics. This allows us 
to understand the human, not as a unit, but rather, “as a set of intensive and extensive 
qualities that can be natural/technological, non/human, in/organic, im/material and so on, 
with which the human gathers into spatiotemporal assemblages.”123 The assemblage, and 
its perpetual movement and negotiation of spaces, demonstrates the body’s ability to 
simultaneously engage in closure and openness: “the body as a singularity that is 
permanently withdrawn.”124 As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos further explains: 
“A body is understood as an assemblage of various conditions and materialities – 
we are isolated things; skin does not separate us from the world; otherness is not 
over there but very much with us, on us, in us…Rigid separation is an 
epistemological construct, often a necessity, according to the foundational fantasy 
of distinction between self and environment”125  
As assemblages bodies become situated in space, and through their movement (whether 
withdrawal or becoming) they produce these spaces. This is the performative action that 
rests at the heart of how bodies express their agential capabilities, and the key to how we 
may understand the relationship between spatial justice and politics. 
Deleuze and Guattari formulated the assemblage as an alternative to subjectivity as it 
emerged within structuralist frameworks. In order to challenge the static nature of being, 
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they focused on the idea of becoming as a process that is capable of bringing language to 
the level of the material:  
“the way an expression relates to a content is not by uncovering or representing it. 
Rather, forms of expression and forms of content communicate through a 
conjunction of their quanta of relative deterritorialization, each intervening, 
operating in the other.”126  
Therefore, we begin to see that performativity is linked to becoming, and becoming is 
itself linked to movement. The assemblage (and the body) is significant for Deleuze and 
Guattari because they claim that although the implications of politics occur at a larger 
scale, the decision-making is taking place at a molecular level.127 There is a constant 
relationship between the molar and molecular dimensions of society in their view, and 
these processes of negotiation and influence give rise to a particular manifestation of 
political thinking and action.   
2.3.3 Responsibility of Indistinction 
The conceptualization of withdrawal has further implications with respect to how it is 
that we can think about responsibility in the age of the Anthropocene, as Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos urges us to do. Through the concept of the responsibility of indistinction, 
we are tasked with thinking about the relations that form between bodies and that define 
the scope of our actions. The responsibility of indistinction is a concept derived from 
Karen Barad’s writing on posthuman bodies and the networks and connections they 
sustain through assemblages. It is premised on the idea that the human body as an 
assemblage that is part of its environment in a more biologically dynamic sense. Barad 
argues that rather than thinking that the body now lacks agential capacity, in fact, it has a 
heightened responsibility to be attuned and attentive to its environment. The 
‘responsibility of indistinction’ is a call to understand the human as one of many bodies, 
in a situated material context, and on the same level as the environment. Yet, does the 
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responsibility of indistinction mean that we must claim that there is no outside? Is the 
answer to ethical action and spatial justice the recognition that we inhabit a perpetually 
differentiating inside that is constantly attempting to reorganize itself in order to appease 
particular bodies simply because they ‘weigh’ more?128  
In “And for Law”, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos clarifies his position with respect to 
agency and the responsibility of indistinction by indicating that bodies can identify 
noxious assemblages that they must not only withdraw from, but must also actively 
resist.129 I think this statement entails an imperative for orientation, and something that 
happens on a material, affective level. If a body can identify ‘noxious’ assemblages 
suggests that these assemblages are a direct affront to the material integrity of a body, and 
that they are both of an environmental and political nature.  
The intimate connection between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ writing and that of 
Deleuze and Guattari provides an indication of the presence of politics within the concept 
of spatial justice. The presence and necessity of thinking politically through this concept 
is further evidenced through the concept of ‘lively agency’ which I will look at more 
closely in the next section. It is through this concept that we may come to understand 
how bodies perform spatial justice.  
2.4 Performing Spatial Justice: Lively Agencies and 
the Reorientation of the Lawscape 
Performing spatial justice allows us to understand how it is that we can capture political 
agency within the ambit of the lawscape. The idea that justice or law are political is a 
problematic concept within legal discourse. In order to maintain its impartiality, law 
cannot be understood to be political, even though political relations influence the 
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operation of the law. However, the theory of justice presented by Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos has granted an opportunity to (re)analyze this fraught, but intimate 
relationship between law and politics, and arguably, to determine more fruitful ways to 
engage with law politically.  
One of the main reasons this can be accomplished is the fact that spatial justice is 
immanent, rather than deferred.130 Spatial justice is also material and produced, and as 
such, it is an event that unfolds at the level of the body, out of the emergence of legal 
assemblages, and their particular, special positioning within the lawscape. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos does not want to reduce the emergence and differentiation 
of these bodies to mere political conflict, which is why he notes that his concept should 
not be confused with an impoverished definition of identity politics, limited by a 
representation of bodies within monolithic categories.131 However, the tilted nature of the 
continuum and the struggle for space between the bodies on the lawscape are indicative 
of more than just an ontological distinction, and rather, mark a reflection of power and 
agency. Politics is not something that we can also read alongside this theory of law and 
spatiality, rather politics is something that must be read as an integral part of the 
theory.132  
2.4.1 What are Lively Agencies? 
In order to understand how bodies perform spatial justice, we must turn to the concept of 
‘lively agency’ and its relationship to responsibility and justice. According to 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, liveliness is  
“the absolute difference of each individual body [which] emerges under paradoxical 
conditions: each body, namely each singularity, is both ‘withdrawn’ and gathered in 
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itself (for how else would it be singular), and at the same time connected to other 
singularities (for how else could it carry on).”133  
Lively bodies withdraw to ensure that the continuum is ruptured, and new bodies are 
presented “depending on the particular combination of bodies participating in it.” 134 The 
simultaneous movement of bodies towards interiority and exteriority (withdrawal and 
connection) suggests that agency is also connected to responsibility because the body is 
always caught up in an assemblage, it is always responsive to other bodies. 
Lively agency and the continuum (as well as the lawscape) are closely connected. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos described the agential capability of bodies as: “vessel 
through which the law emerges, since each body is responsible for its position in relation 
to the wider assemblage.”135 Responsibility emerges as the position of the body is 
established, and it is responsive to that context and those other bodies. In this sense, it is 
performative. It is the product of the relations that give rise to a particular assemblage. It 
is through the assemblage that we come to understand how and why a body could act, 
and could be acted upon by the processes that sustain the lawscape. 
Lively agency denotes how bodies are engaged in rupturing processes in the first place, 
which is why Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos turns to Karen Barad’s concept of “‘agential 
separability’ to signal the need for boundaries between bodies.”136 These boundaries are 
formed as the continuum is folded to give shape to the bodies within, and through this 
process an agential position emerges.137 This is closely connected to the idea of 
responsibility because it is also formed in relation to the assemblage. The “call to 
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justice”, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos indicates, is contextualized, and responsive to 
the environment and relationships that gave shape to the body in the first place.138 
A body’s lively agency is closer to the notion of an “affective ability.”139 It is through 
understanding how bodies move, and “whether and to what extent they can form 
assemblages that respond to environmental conditions in a way that results in conative 
perpetuation,”140 that we begin to grasp this distinct form of agency. Lively agency does 
not denote an individual choice, nor does it denote a position that results from the 
institution bodies might find themselves related to, instead it is material and emplaced, 
and expressed through a relationship between human and nonhuman assemblages. Lively 
agency, then, is an important aspect of this continuous process of assemblage building 
that takes place within the lawscape. As bodies shift and re-position themselves, they re-
establish their responsibility to each other, and continuously re-define the possibility for 
spatial justice.  
2.4.2 Lively Agencies and the Reorientation of the Lawscape 
The lawscape can only be reoriented as a result of the movement and re-organization of 
the bodies within it, and spatial justice can only emerge if the reorientation of a lawscape 
reverberates through other lawscapes. This event is not abstract, as in a shift in the law 
that is removed from its material context, rather it occurs through a material engagement 
with the world. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos privileges matter because it brings us a 
richer understanding of the implications of the abstract dimension of law allowing us to 
understand the full capacity and implications of the law. He notes that a   
“critical reading of autopoiesis, which, however does not succumb to critique but 
carries on by unfolding itself along the object of its attention, moves alongside its 
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body and employs its folds in order to construct concepts and conceptual practices 
that aim at a different reality.”141  
This practice is not exclusively ontological, and it relies on a material-discursive practice, 
a performance or a practice that enacts it within the world, reproduces it, and gives shape 
to the social, political, and environmental conditions of existence.  
If we understand law and space as mutually constitutive of each other, then politics is the 
element that provokes their emergence. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos describes it as 
excess, but this is only if we understand politics as the partisan discourses that clash in 
negotiation, rather than politics as constitutive of the relations and practices that facilitate 
material existence. Therefore, these processes are not autopoietic in the Luhmannian 
sense, rather, borrowing from Deleuze, they form a dynamic relationship between 
interior/exterior, so that the innermost layers are the most dynamic. Deleuze introduced 
this through the plane of immanence (which is similar to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ 
continuum) and if we consider his theories closely, we note that he advances processes of 
de-stabilization. It is helpful to think about it in terms of the permeability and processes 
of movement that occur within this boundary. In this sense, we begin to see correlations 
between Deleuze’s thought and that of Graham Harman’s theory of withdrawal. They 
both harken back to a moving, dynamic and ever-shifting layer, that becomes ordered, if 
only briefly, while maintaining the potentiality of change. This element of 
‘unpredictability’ holds the key to the bodies’ ability to effect a reorientation of the 
lawscape.142 
Spatial justice is premised on a movement and transformation of the current conditions of 
a lawscape; but it does not guarantee a better world, just a different one.143 The process of 
withdrawal depends on an “articulated strategy”144 that takes place in physical as well as 
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symbolic places. Spatial justice emerges when we are presented with the possibility of a 
‘new’ world, and when that has an impact by resulting in a production of space.145 Yet, as 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos reminds us,  
“any reorientation of space can only occur through repeated encounters with other 
bodies. Such encounters take place on the space of withdrawal from the atmospherics 
of the existing lawscape. No doubt the new lawscape needs to prove its relevance. But 
spatial justice as an emergence takes place regardless of the validity of the new 
lawscape. It is enough to reorient the lawscape towards its new validation.”146 
The process of reorientation is marked by a material-discursive (performative) practice 
that attempts to claim a resistance through withdrawal from the atmosphere that 
dissimulates conflict. However, it is through a negotiation of places within the 
atmosphere that this can be made possible. These engagements between bodies, the 
negotiations of material spaces, and processes that think and create a different context, 
each sustain the possibility of spatial justice. These practices, then, are indicative of a 
form of politics, conceived as a struggle between bodies to affirm themselves, yet at the 
same time, withdraw in order to perpetuate the processes of creation. Despite the fact that 
the body withdraws into an interiority, it simultaneously gives shape to the body, and 
places it in contact with an exteriority. The performance of spatial justice rests in these 
processes of tension, redefinition and movement.   
2.5 Conclusion 
The processes of negotiation of space inherent in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ project 
of spatial justice are indicative of a political practice that operates to precipitate the 
possibility of spatial justice. This political practice influences the ruptures in the 
continuum that may cause a reorientation of the lawscape. Drawing on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work I argued that withdrawal acts as a productive and creative force, much 
like the processes of becoming conceptualized by these philosophers in their work. The 
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productive and ultimately political negotiations denoted through withdrawal occur at the 
interstices of a body’s negotiation of space.  
In the next chapter, I draw a connection between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos concept 
of spatial justice and Indigenous resurgent practices to demonstrate how bodies can 
engage in a performance of spatial justice. I will draw on the writings of John Borrows, 
an Anishinaabe legal scholar, to show how the dynamic character of Indigenous law and 
resurgent practice is demonstrative of a practice of spatial justice. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Performing Spatial Justice and Indigenous Resurgence 
3.1 Introduction 
The final chapter of the thesis will demonstrate how spatial justice can be approached as 
a performative practice by engaging in a comparative analysis between Andreas 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice and John Borrows’ writings on 
freedom, Indigenous law and resurgence. A central objective of this thesis is to 
understand the implications of engaging the idea of legal subjectivity in relation to a 
grounded or material legal practice. Spatial justice offers an entry point into a discussion 
of law and justice that engages with the role of the nonhuman or the more-than-human. 
John Borrows’ writings on freedom and Indigenous legal philosophy (or as he calls it, 
‘physical philosophy’) allows us to grasp a practice of spatial justice. Also, it is not a 
coincidence that Borrows’ writings, and Indigenous legal philosophy more generally, are 
the source of a practice of spatial justice as their engagement with the more-than-human 
permits the re-conceptualization of legal subjectivity. I believe this perspective on law 
and legal practice can open up more fruitful discussions with respect to the future of 
political lawyering.  
Both Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Borrows argue that law emerges through an 
engagement with the world, rather than an experience of the world.147 I believe that this 
fundamental point distinguishes their work from that of most legal geographers because 
spatiality and materiality bear a distinct agential capability within these forms of legal 
practice, and a performance of spatial justice is not limited to the human legal subject, but 
rather it requires a situated relationality with other bodies, both human or more-than-
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human.148 This perspective affords a different understanding of ethics and responsibility, 
which as Borrows and others have noted, is a cornerstone of Indigenous traditional 
knowledge.149 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, drawing on posthumanism, identifies this 
ethical relationship as the responsibility of indistinction.150 Although there are some 
differences between these theories, in both cases, a relationship arises from a contextual, 
grounded and contingent encounter, and through this material event or struggle, arises the 
possibility of reorientation and spatial justice. The law is always grounded; it is never 
only abstract.  
As a non-Indigenous person, my familiarity with Indigenous law and knowledge is 
limited to the research undertaken to write this chapter. Although I believe this thesis 
contributes to legal scholarship related to both spatial justice and Indigenous law, I 
understand that certain nuances or perspectives might be side-stepped because I do not 
have a lived or learned experience of Indigenous knowledge and traditions. In particular, 
I want to note that while I make use of the broader term of more-than-human and 
compare it to the non-human or lively agency in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ work, I 
do not mean to equate the two. I will employ the term more-than-human, primarily in 
relation to Indigenous scholarship, while the term nonhuman will be used in reference to 
the work of posthumanists.  
Also, the term Indigenous peoples has often been used as a monolith, thus failing to 
account for the various forms of traditional knowledge and the different approaches taken 
by different Nations. I do not mean to replicate this with the term Indigenous law. I did 
                                                 
       
148
 I should note that legal geographers, notably Irus Braverman and Nicholas Blomley, have engaged 
in writing about the more-than-human. See Braverman, Irus, ed. Animals, Biopolitics, Law: Lively 
Legalities (New York: Routledge, 2016) and Ojalammi, Sanna and Nicholas Blomley. “Dancing with 
Wolves: Making Legal Territory in a More-than-human World.” in Geoforum 62 (2015): 51-60. 
       
149
 See Borrows, John. Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2016). 
       
150
 See Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas. Spatial Justice: Body Lawscape Atmosphere (New 
York: Routledge, 2015); Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas. “Lively Agency: Life and Law in the 
Anthropocene,” in Animals, Biopolitics, Law: Lively Legalities, edited by Irus Braverman (New York: 
Routledge, 2016): 193-210. 
58 
 
consider whether using Indigenous legal traditions or legal orders would be a more 
appropriate term, or whether I could state that I am working only on Anishinaabe law; 
however, neither of those felt appropriate in this context because I do not have a 
sufficient understanding of Anishinaabe law to make specific claims, and because I 
believe that the project of spatial justice in relation to the concept of resurgence can be 
applied more broadly. In order to capture this dynamic, I chose to focus on Indigenous 
law as an umbrella term, but I do not want it to suggest that there is one way, or one 
particular practice that defines the experiences of all Indigenous peoples in Canada. 
The first part of this chapter outlines aspects of Indigenous legal theory that will be used 
to advance my argument. As I mentioned earlier, this chapter is centered on the work of 
John Borrows whose writing on Anishinaabe law and practice is outlined in various 
books, notably Drawing Out Law: A Spirits’ Guide and Freedom and Indigenous 
Constitutionalism. The former, which is both personal reflection and rigorous theorizing, 
weaves dreams, stories, anecdotes and law to bring us closer to an understanding of 
Indigenous knowledge, its processes of world-making, and the idea of agency. Borrows’ 
work provides a starting point from which to think about justice and responsibility in 
relation to the more-than-human, and to understand why this is an important step in 
advancing broader social justice objectives.  
The second part of this chapter will mark the crossroads between Indigenous law and a 
practice of spatial justice by providing a comparative analysis of the relationship between 
Indigenous resurgence and agency, and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ Spinozist 
interpretation of withdrawal as an onto-epistemological movement. This section draws on 
my writing in the second chapter and helps us locate the conditions of possibility for 
political agency within the ethical and legal frameworks of Indigenous law and spatial 
justice. In this section, I will also build on the comparison between resurgence and 
withdrawal to discuss what a practice of spatial justice (or reorientation of the lawscape) 
may look like. This section engages more closely with the concept of freedom as a 
practice in the context of the struggle to engage with ideas of reconciliation and 
resurgence beyond state recognition.  
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The third section of this chapter will address two case-studies in order to demonstrate 
how spatial justice can be performed. The first case-study will engage with Rebecca 
Belmore’s performance art piece, Facing the Monumental, which took place at Queen’s 
Park on Canada Day in 2012. The second case-study is an analysis of discussions 
surrounding the ‘rule of law’ within the context of the recent Wet’suwet’en and 
Unist’ot’en protests against the Coastal Gaslink Pipeline Ltd. In British Columbia. 
3.2 Indigenous Legal Philosophy 
Indigenous law has a variety of sources: ancient stories, customs and codes, historical 
agreements with the Crown, Canadian common and civil law, constitutional law and 
contemporary international instruments.151 This multiplicity of sources reflects the 
complex legal and political reality of this area of law and it marks a commitment to 
understanding a contemporary and evolving definition of Indigenous law, which serves to 
counter a colonialist understanding of Indigenous law and traditions as fixed in the 
past.152 The persistent obstruction of the validity of contemporary claims made by 
Indigenous peoples underscores the continuing damage caused by a settler colonial 
mentality, and it diminishes the positive influence of Indigenous legal philosophy on 
contemporary legal and political theory. 
In the last half-decade, the Canadian legal landscape has seen an increased interest in the 
future of Indigenous rights and the role of Indigenous law alongside the common law 
system. In 2014, Beverly McLachlin, Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that the future of Canadian constitutional law will be shaped by aboriginal 
rights, rather than the Charter, denoting the high court’s intention to focus on clarifying 
the parameters of s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and make substantial steps towards 
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reconciliation.153 In September 2018, the University of Victoria Faculty of Law 
inaugurated its Joint Degree Program in Canadian Common Law and Indigenous Legal 
Orders. This program is the first of its kind in the world.154 These hopeful steps are 
shifting legal discourse surrounding Indigenous rights in Canada, as well as the 
application of Indigenous legal philosophical concepts to Canadian law, and they mark an 
effort to contribute to the project of decolonization of the Canadian settler state.  
These varied sources of Indigenous law demonstrate how legal practice can operate at 
different levels and in different contexts, outside what is commonly associated with the 
legal realm (our common law systems of legal practice). Indigenous constitutionalism has 
started to shift common law discourses, notably in the way common law jurisprudence on 
Indigenous rights is recognizing the validity of Indigenous legal traditions.155 Yet, despite 
this progress, tensions and problems within processes of recognition and reconciliation 
complicate and oftentimes obstruct more transformative efforts towards self-
determination.156 I argue that the application and proliferation of Indigenous law is 
important to this struggle for self-determination, and it is useful to think through the ways 
in which the objectives of spatial justice lend themselves to legal and political 
transformation that can acknowledge and further the contributions of Indigenous legal 
philosophy. 
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Before I continue this chapter, I note that there is a largely unacknowledged debt to the 
relational ontologies of Indigenous philosophy in forms of Western philosophical 
thought, including the texts of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.157 Arguably, this fact 
also contributes to the similarities between Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s posthuman 
take on spatial justice which is largely driven by a Deleuzian analysis, and Anishinaabe 
conceptions of the more-than-human which are present in John Borrows’ work, as well as 
that of other Indigenous scholars. I will not address this further because it is beyond the 
scope of my research, but I believe it is important to acknowledge this point.  
As I note above, this chapter’s views of Indigenous law are informed primarily by 
Anishinaabe law, as John Borrows is a member of the Chippewas of the Nawash First 
Nation at Neyaashiinigmiing (Cape Crocker Indian Reserve) and his writing is influenced 
primarily by Anishinaabe legal traditions.158 The Anishinaabeg are the second-largest 
Indigenous group in Canada, and their territory spans the Great Lakes region, parts of 
northern Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, as well as parts of the northern United 
States.159  
My interest in spatial justice in relation to Indigenous law stems from the fact that 
Indigenous legal thinking is already well-positioned to consider the mutual constitutivity 
of law and space and, as such, it can shed light on how we may approach the 
shortcomings of our legal system through a practice of spatial justice. The next sub-
sections outline a few key concepts in Indigenous legal philosophy that will demonstrate 
how it relates to the concept of spatial justice. 
3.2.1 ‘Physical’ Philosophy 
In Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, John Borrows introduces the idea of 
Indigenous law as a ‘physical’ philosophy or akinoomaagewin which is premised on a 
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continuous practice of grounded or Earth-related emancipatory traditions.160 It is an 
approach that suggests an analysis of an experience of the world, and in a sense, it might 
be interpreted as a phenomenology.161 The performative nature of this practice is driven 
by a resistance to the status quo. Borrows calls this a “settled flux”, meaning “our 
perpetual motion coexists with a persistent and enduring near-permanence.”162 The 
physicality of Anishinaabe philosophy enacts grounded, but mobile agents, who are 
formed through both material and abstract processes. This perspective acts as a departure 
from the fixed and unitary legal subjects of the common law, which are framed 
abstractly, through the relationship they share over land, rather than with it. For this 
reason, how one’s relationship to the land is framed (and subsequently, how we 
understand legal subjectivity) impacts the ethical perspective and practice of the legal and 
political agents, and eventually, the ability to produce social and political change through 
legal frameworks.   
There are two guiding principles for a practice of ‘physical’ philosophy according to 
Borrows: dibenindizowin and mino-bimaadiziwin, which mean, respectively, that “a 
person possesses liberty within themselves and their relationships,” and “living a good 
life.”163 Although many works on Indigenous law, including Borrows’ writing on the 
subject, are focused on governance, harmonization and community-building framed 
around various values and principles, these do not act as rigid a priori categories that 
impose a universal moral order onto the agents of Indigenous law.164 What he describes 
as this ‘physical’ philosophical approach is more so aligned with an ethical practice, and 
in this sense, I believe it reflects some of the ways in which Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
conceptualizes bodies’ movement and engagements within the lawscape. There is no 
guarantee that the form of action undertaken will have the desired results, which is why 
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he proposes a contextualized, practice-oriented understanding of Indigenous law that is 
flexible and adaptable. 
This perspective of Indigenous knowledge as a form of ‘place-based’ ethical practice is 
similar to what Glen S. Coulthard calls grounded normativity.165 He argues that 
“land…[is] an ontological framework for understanding relationships” between humans 
and nonhumans.166 By engaging with the law in a grounded way (i.e. by drawing it out 
with the natural surroundings, rocks, trees, water, and land) we begin to understand that 
there is no “jurisprudential center of the universe” that is ‘the human’.167 This perspective 
on law deviates from the liberal theoretical norm of legal subjectivity centered on human 
experience and the rest of the world as mere resource for human consumption and use. 
This de-centering of the human legal subject is a central premise of Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ writing as well, and both mark a new horizon for the practice of law, and 
for conceptualizations of the ‘subject’ of law.  
As I noted in earlier chapters, spatial justice, a product of the reorientation of the 
lawscape, does not necessarily occur when a lawscape is reoriented. The shift must be 
transformative, and as such, it must resonate across several lawscapes. Through his 
analysis of examples of direct action undertaken by various First Nations communities 
across Canada, we could argue that Borrows identifies successful and less successful 
attempts to attain spatial justice through a reorientation of the lawscape.168 He provides 
insights into the varied and complex strategies employed in these cases, and suggests 
which have been successful and which have not. This approach demonstrates that certain 
practices, in this case direct action and the setting up of blockades, are not always 
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successful, and that outcomes may differ depending on the history, timing and context of 
each First Nation.  
3.2.2 Agency, Freedom and Resurgence 
Agency, according to Borrows, means living according to one’s vision within a network 
of people.169 It is a recognition of the independence and interdependence of living in a 
community, and the mutual respect and responsibility that emerge from that 
relationship.170 This definition of agency rests at the core of Borrows’ idea of a situated 
freedom: freedom as practice and experience, rather than an abstract concept (or in a 
liberal philosophical sense, freedom as property, thus fixed and owned).171 This 
perspective on agency and freedom emerges because of the way in which spatiality and 
the relationship between human and more-than-human bodies is framed in Anishinaabe 
law. Although it is grounded, this form of agential practice relies on mobile, rather than 
fixed agents.172 Agency, then, becomes a fundamental concept for Borrows’ theories on 
Indigenous self-determination and resurgent practice through stories, experiences, and 
relationships with (and within) the environment.  
Despite the presence of guiding or universal principles and values in Indigenous thought, 
Borrows rejects the moral universalism of liberal philosophy in large part because it has 
been persistently utilized as a mechanism to justify and further advance the dispossession 
of Indigenous peoples through processes of annihilation and assimilation. Rather, these 
guiding principles form the basis of an ethical subjectivity, and not a moral order. 
Therefore, he seeks a different path for Indigenous law in Canada, and presents an 
alternative to the liberal theoretical foundation that informs our legal systems. 
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Therefore, Borrows rejects the spatial and politico-legal configurations of property 
relations within liberal societies as they have been applied in Indigenous contexts, and he 
contends that the framing of an a priori Indigenous identity has limited the contemporary 
realities and experiences of Indigenous people.173 These traditions can adapt and change 
over time to fit the needs of their communities. Stories are re-told to respond to 
contemporary needs, and new stories are crafted to provide guidance with respect to new 
issues. Indigenous traditions are not static, and political rhetoric and legal judgments that 
have attempted to limit them as such have had a negative impact on Indigenous 
communities’ ability to flourish.  
Resurgent practice and freedom are closely related, and they are important to 
understanding how spatial justice may apply in this context. Leanne Betasamosake 
Simpson, a Miichi Saagig Nishnaabeg scholar and poet, describes resurgent practices as: 
“Biiskabiyang— the process of returning to ourselves, a reengagement with the things 
we have left behind, a re-emergence, an unfolding from the inside out— is  a concept, 
an individual and collective process of decolonization and resurgence. To me, it is the 
embodied processes as freedom. It is a flight out of the structure of settler colonialism 
and into the processes and relationships of freedom and self- determination encoded 
and practiced within Nishnaabewin or grounded normativity… My flight to escape 
colonial reality was a flight into Nishnaabewin. It was a returning, in the present, to 
myself. It was an unfolding of a different present. It was freedom as a way of being as 
a constellation of relationships, freedom as world making, freedom as a practice. It 
was biiskabiyang.”174 
This is a necessary part of the practice or resurgence according to Simpson, and it is a 
significant step towards decolonial practice.  
Glen S. Coulthard, following Franz Fanon’s anticolonial theories, also argues that the 
development of a radical praxis necessitates a “turning away” or a process of “self-
recognition.”175 According to him, ressentiment is a necessary step in a process of 
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decolonization because it acts as a catalyst for rupture from processes of colonial 
subjection. However, Coulthard argues that Fanon’s theory of ressentiment is not the 
same thing as resentment, which is simply reactionary or oppositional, rather it is a 
productive and ‘self-affirmative’ process.176 Whether we consider a ‘turning inward’ or 
‘biiskabiyang’ or ‘withdrawal’ the process bears significance because it is capable of 
creating a stepping-stone towards a “more just relationship.”177 For this reason, Coulthard 
does not view reconciliation as the solution to Indigenous peoples’ current struggles 
within a settler colonial context, and offers resurgence as the alternative, almost as a 
development of a cultural collective consciousness, that can be approached both at the 
individual and group level in order to advance the interests of Indigenous peoples.178 
And, I would highlight, that this is a significantly spatial and material project, as 
Coulthard himself notes the significance of the use of blockades as mechanisms for 
asserting Indigenous sovereignty.179 
Further, an early theorist of resurgence, Taiaiaike Alfred, who defined resurgence in the 
context of Indigenous sovereignty, argued that it is necessary not only to regain political 
space, but to fill it up with Indigenous content.180 Along with Jeff Corntassel, Alfred 
argues that,  
“Indigenous pathways of authentic action and freedom struggle start with people 
transcending colonialism on an individual basis – a strength that soon reverberates 
outward from self to family, clan, community and into all of the broader relationships 
that form an Indigenous existence. In this way, Indigenousness is reconstructed, 
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reshaped and actively lived as resurgence against the dispossessing and demeaning 
processes of annihilation that are inherent to colonialism.”181 
These views of resurgence offer an alternative to a particularly ineffective (and ultimately 
harmful) form of reconciliation, which has been persistently exemplified by the Canadian 
government.182 Oftentimes, the concept of reconciliation has either been deferred or it has 
been interpreted as form of acceptance within the ambit of the Canadian nation state with 
little desire or action towards structural change and mutual respect. This type of action 
has led Indigenous scholars, like Coulthard, to oppose reconciliation outright (and to 
declare it a failed project) because it depends on a politics of recognition, which means 
that it is always dependent on the goodwill of the settler state. Borrows, on the other 
hand, advocates for a simultaneous process of resurgence and reconciliation.183 Although 
he does not support a non-transformative form of reconciliation, Borrows disagrees with 
Coulthard’s more radical project because he is attempting to frame his analysis in terms 
of a collective effort that recognizes the tension between independence and 
interdependence.184 According to Borrows, Indigenous peoples must move from “critique 
to construction,” and seek out “‘transformative’ reconciliation [which] must be 
empowered by robust practices of resurgence.”185  
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This perspective sets up Borrows’ notion of ‘situated freedom’. The idea of situated 
freedom acknowledges  
“that we are all differently situated and governed, in both constraining and 
enabling ways, in relationships of division, patriarchy, imperialism, racism, 
capitalism, ecological devastation, and poverty.”186  
He prefers this approach because it is capable of capturing nuance and complexity, and 
more likely to produce transformative change. Borrows argues for a response to 
Indigenous issues that is sensitive to context and seeks the best practice, not necessarily 
the most reactionary one. As he and James Tully note, the process of resurgence and 
reconciliation,  
“requires attentiveness and attunement and must move beyond the simplistic 
models and metaphors standardly used to mis-describe and dominate the field 
from one perspective or another…Layers of meaning and ambiguity reside in any 
system of instruction and practice, and they embrace the social as well as the 
physical activity of construction.”187 
Therefore, to be of ‘one mind’ in this context does  
“not seem to refer to complete agreement, but to understanding each other, 
holding all views in tension. Then reconciliation negotiations began. So this form 
of dialogue can be seen as a pathway of and to reconciliation.”188 
Although these accounts of resurgence and freedom do not always overlap, I believe they 
support the same goal of bringing forward transformative social change through a 
concerted revitalization and affirmation of Indigenous knowledge in a variety of ‘scapes’. 
Yet resurgence is not necessarily done outside of settler colonialism or simply in 
opposition to it. Rather, I would argue that it is closer to a conative process that operates 
simultaneously as a means of affirming Indigenous knowledge, and demonstrating how it 
shifts and adapts to contemporary contexts. Through this operation, it demonstrates the 
lasting presence of Indigenous knowledge in sites that have been imbued with the 
authority of the settler state. Resurgence acts as a mechanism to perpetually challenge, 
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disrupt and reveal alternative spatial configurations that are taken for granted within the 
nation state. I will take this up again in the final section of this chapter, when I discuss 
Rebecca Belmore’s performance piece, Facing the Monumental (2012), which 
demonstrates what resurgent practice looks like and how we can see the reorientation of 
the lawscape, and the potential for spatial justice.  
3.2.3 The More-Than-Human of ‘All Our Relations’ 
The relational philosophy of Indigenous thought is premised on the idea that more-than-
human entities share an equal footing with human entities within the larger legal and 
political framework of Indigenous communities. At its core rests the notion of ‘all our 
relations’ which prioritizes a relationship of responsibility and mutual respect within 
inter-human relationships, as well as human and more-than-human relationships. This 
idea has been extended into discussions about law, especially within the context of 
environmental justice, but it can hold greater implications in terms of the contributions of 
Indigenous legal orders to common law systems. As Borrows reminds us: “Reconciliation 
between Indigenous peoples and the Crown requires our collective reconciliation with the 
earth.”189 
The pursuit of a decentered human subjectivity is a familiar premise of critical legal 
theory contexts, and as such, it appears unusual that discussions on posthumanism within 
this context have eschewed the topic of the more-than-human and the influence of 
Indigenous theory. Although the concept has been recently taken up in discussions on 
spatial justice, particularly in environmental studies and legal geography contexts,190 it is 
oftentimes incorporated as an attribute of Western theoretical perspectives. I believe that 
this reluctance to engage with the contributions of Indigenous thought in a substantial 
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manner reflects a gap in critical legal scholarship. Perhaps this is due to the fact that, as 
Regna Darnell notes, it is difficult to find a way to have these disparate theories speak to 
each other.191 However, I expect that John Borrows and other Indigenous legal scholars 
would differ, as much of their scholarship has attempted to find ways to incorporate 
Indigenous philosophy in a substantial way within common law systems. Nonetheless, 
with respect to critical legal theory, and the challenges it poses to liberal legal thought, I 
believe that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ work on spatial justice provides us with a 
glimpse into how these disciplines may be bridged, though in both cases it requires a 
challenge to liberal legal formulations. 
We must be wary, however, of the more-than-human marking merely another way of 
discussing the nonhuman of posthumanism (i.e. animate and inanimate organisms, 
technology, objects). Borrowing from Robertson, I argue that these engagements do not 
“‘think of the land in that way.’”192 The more-than-human presents an important element 
of the relational ontology that defines Indigenous practices. As Sean Robertson explains 
with respect to Secwepemc understandings of Indigenous knowledge and the land, 
“[they] have not simply (biophysical) relationships with the land. They also have a co-
constitutive relationship with it that shapes their being, informs their doings and orients 
their ethics to the collective…”193 These relations form the ground of traditional 
Indigenous knowledge, and they guide legal and political practices. Although there are 
overlaps in terms of the sense of collectivity and interdependence they do not reflect 
indistinction in the posthuman sense. 
An important contribution of Indigenous philosophy’s perspective on interdependence 
through the concept of ‘all of our relations’ is the shift in understanding the human 
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relationship to the land, and the legal implications this formulation of human subjectivity 
holds. While liberal legal theory understands land as resource to be extracted for human 
use and profit regardless of the impact this may have on the sustainability of other 
entities, Indigenous philosophy, by capturing a relationship of interdependence with the 
land intergenerationally is able to frame a different subjective position. The de-centering 
of the human legal subject is a necessary step in finding ways to engage more equitably 
within legal landscapes. If agency and freedom can be extended to the more-than-human, 
then: 
 “Rocks, water, plants, insects, birds, animals, and humans with little social, 
economic, or political power must be part of this circle of care. Freedom for these 
ones often requires that we restrain ourselves rather than exploit them as resources for 
our own selfish purposes.”194 
Furthermore, as Borrows and others have noted, this is a necessary and fundamental step 
in the process of reconciliation. Acknowledging the interdependence of human and more-
than-human beings can promote better living within communities and states, and this 
must be incorporated within larger legal discourses.195 The ‘physical’ philosophical 
premise of this relationality is that “being is ‘being-with’” and this ethical standpoint can 
facilitate forms of “transformative reconciliation” which may be either “constructive, 
obstructive, and contestatory,” but will ultimately lead to “a critical mass of networked 
practices that transform vicious systems into virtuous ones.”196 
Sean Robertson’s interview with Secwepemc-Okanagan traditional land user, Dorothy 
Christian provides a useful glimpse into what practice may mean in an ethical context 
that gives deference to the more-than-human:  
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“‘You don’t own the land: The land owns you. That is where our songs come 
from, that is where our designs come from, that is where we come from. Our spirit 
is integral to the land, it is a reciprocal relationship...’ You know when Indigenous 
people say, ‘‘All my relations’’? It is not taken lightly, you are related to 
everything in the universe: the trees, the birds, the four-leggeds, the little crawly 
things, the water: you are related. It is like you take care of them, they will take 
care of you. According to this relational geographical imagination, since 
individuals ‘‘come from’’ (non)humans, freedom rests on support for ‘‘the 
universe.’’”197  
The mutual reciprocity inherent in these relationships creates a context that moves us 
away from liberal legal theory’s understanding of the human subject and their 
relationship over land as property, rather than their relationship with the land as agent. 
However, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is also moving us away from this discussion 
towards the materiality of law. He understands law as a practice that emerges with our 
surroundings rather than law that is overlaid on them. This fundamental shift in 
perspective regarding our relationship to the land gives rise to an ethical relationship 
premised on interdependence and material practice. This marks the significance of 
understanding a grounded (or material) legal relationship. We begin to see a number of 
correlated themes between Indigenous legal philosophy and Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ theory of justice. Through storytelling as practice the land is oftentimes 
conceptualized as a continuum onto which the onto-epistemological relationship unfolds. 
Withdrawal then, as a turning towards the land, towards grounded knowledge, is a 
simultaneous action of engagement with the material (and ontological) and at the same 
time a production of knowledge (or epistemology).  
Regna Darnell provides useful insight into how the ephemeral quality of everyday 
practice can nonetheless be grounded. As she explains regarding the tensions between 
Indigenous and Western philosophical systems,  
“Both modes of knowing are systems: they form non-random patterns, even when 
the critical variables are too complex to circumscribe. The fluid and contingent 
may be a more effective way to live in the flux of day-to-day life, but it is equally 
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necessary to have moorings in certainty that are akin to the non-negotiability  of 
(some) physical regularities, such as the intractability of the world/nature. The 
question for moral philosophy, as for everyday affairs, is to recognize the 
difference and respond appropriately, to keep the questions in balance and adapt 
the methodology to the question(s) under consideration.”198        
I note this because it reflects the kind of shift in thinking about moral philosophy (and 
liberal legal theory) that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is trying to accomplish through his 
ideas on the materiality of law. However, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos explains how it 
is that these ‘intractable’ material forms are nonetheless vulnerable or responsive to the 
onto-epistemological influence of law, or how they are co-produced through those 
encounters. And, in a sense, this perspective gives more due to the agency of those 
material bodies that have liveliness and that contribute to the development of Indigenous 
legal frameworks.  
Through his reflection on the idea of ‘drawing out law’, Borrows acknowledges that the 
natural world is not formed of “passive objects to be acted upon,” but rather that these 
material bodies “had agency and a power of choice which they exercised every day. They 
were subjects and actively participated in the world.”199 Practicing law in this way can 
open up possibilities for social and political change that can hold significance beyond 
Indigenous communities, and can shift frameworks within the broader Canadian context.  
Before I end what is an already substantially lengthy introduction to Indigenous legal 
philosophy, I do want to turn to the relationship between the more-than-human and 
storytelling, as this plays an important role in the ethical practices at the heart of this 
project. The trickster is a familiar figure in Indigenous story-telling that oftentimes brings 
to light these ethical relationships. Nanabush, the figure of the trickster in Anishinaabe 
lore, is a half-spirit half-human entity that travels the world and creates mischief for the 
Anishinaabeg.200 He is a significant figure because he embodies the ethical perspective 
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that runs through Indigenous law. Nanabush’s actions tend to bring to light the 
complexities and ambivalences inherent in challenging situations in order to allow 
individuals to engage with decision-making processes.201  
Narrative, then, becomes an important part of Borrows’ theory of Indigenous law because 
it contemplates alternatives and the possibility of thinking of a system of Indigenous law 
that functions alongside the common law system.202 Story-telling shifts and changes to 
accommodate the times. The figure of Nanabush engages in situations which suspend 
decision-making in favour of thinking. They are not necessarily didactic (though we 
could argue that they inform an ethical perspective), but they let the audience sit with a 
problem, so that they may find their own path to it. That is the freedom (and autonomy) 
that Borrows wants us to gather from Indigenous law. Although, as Charles Taylor notes, 
narratives can serve to “deepen our understanding of abstract or broad principles by 
contextualizing and making visible some of the ‘irreducible’ background they are 
embedded in and emerge from,”203 they also serve to unsettle those very backgrounds. 
In Drawing Out Law, Borrows uses the ambivalence of Indigenous story-telling to inform 
his style of writing. The Trickster plays an important role in how social and political 
situations are explored and analyzed. The Trickster is represented in various ways, such 
as, a mischievous black dog that lives on the reserve or a conservative law professor at 
University of Toronto. Borrows presents these characters as complex figures that disrupt 
the direction and thinking of our main character, the author himself. The reader does not 
interpret them as oppositional, rather as part and parcel of his experience, while they 
challenge and disrupt his thinking/feeling/stories. This example is demonstrative of how 
Indigenous philosophy treats conflict and contradiction.204                                                                                                                                     
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3.2.4 Conclusion 
The main objectives of this first section of the chapter are to explain what Indigenous law 
is and what its relationship to Canadian law is, as well as to explain how it derives a 
particular ethical practice from its understanding of our relationships with the more-than-
human. I accomplish this introduction to this area of law by engaging with some of the 
key concepts that I encountered through my research: ‘physical’ philosophy, agency and 
‘situated freedom,’ and the more-than-human. Indigenous law is premised on a distinct 
conceptualization of a body’s relationship to the natural environment, and in a sense to 
spatiality, which holds significant implications for an understanding of legal subjectivity, 
agency and ethics. Furthermore, Indigenous law, though premised on a grounded 
normativity, is not fixed, as Western theory would understand it, but rather it is flexible, 
adaptive and mobile.205 In this sense, I believe it is important to understand how it is that 
Indigenous law presents us with an ethical framework that can aid in our understanding 
of a practice of spatial justice. 
3.3 Withdrawal and Resurgence: Toward a Practice of 
Spatial Justice 
The previous section outlined several key concepts which play an important role in our 
understanding of Indigenous law, and attempted to demonstrate how Indigenous law 
operates as a material legal practice, in particular through its relationship with the more-
than-human. This section will be making the connection between these key concepts in 
Indigenous law and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice in order to 
demonstrate how we can begin to think of a practice of spatial justice through the 
operations of Indigenous law. Specifically, this section will compare and contrast 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ concept of withdrawal and the concept of Indigenous 
resurgence. 
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The other notable concepts which I would like to link to Indigenous law are the lawscape, 
atmosphere and spatial justice. As I have mentioned before, Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos reframes the concept of spatial justice based on a desire to understand 
spatiality as more than abstract and representational, and to open up new avenues for 
understanding the transformative capabilities of spatial justice. I build on Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ theory to think through what a practice of spatial justice might mean. How 
do we think of law and justice in a context of a posthuman legal subject, and how might 
that limit or advance the attainment of justice? How can law capture the complex 
contextuality of its subjects, as social and political actors, as well as legal actors? What is 
the role of the nonhuman in this dynamic, and how can we consider the influence of 
nonhuman legal agents? And, finally, what implications does this hold for the practice of 
political lawyering? I believe that Indigenous legal philosophy and practice hold some of 
the answers to these questions because Indigenous legal philosophy is premised on an 
interrelatedness between human and more-than-human, and as such, it frames a distinct 
relationship to space and spatiality. One of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ main concepts, 
withdrawal, provides a useful entry point in our discussion of a practice of spatial justice; 
therefore, the rest of this section will focus on how we can understand withdrawal as a 
practice that facilitates spatial justice, and how it can be related to Indigenous legal 
philosophy through the practice of resurgence. This perspective will also allow us to 
understand how spatial justice maintains its political character, despite its operation 
through a relationship to the land. 
3.3.1 Withdrawing from the Lawscape 
Withdrawal into the continuum marks the shifting motions of the legal assemblages that 
populate Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ lawscapes. In a sense, the lawscape is the 
material and sensorial manifestation of the law.206 When Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
states that law and space are mutually constitutive, he means to say that we could not 
understand or experience the operation of the law outside of its spatial and material 
manifestation. As legal subjects, we are produced through law’s grounding (or its spatial 
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and material dimension). However, he also wants us to understand that space is not 
simply the medium, but also a fully cooperating agent. Space and law are co-producing, 
both discursively and materially. The law is simultaneously reproduced and affirmed 
through the ways we inhabit and live through its constraints. The spatiality of law is 
premised on inherent limits that give shape to social and political expression.207 And, 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues for a conceptualization of the law as an object or 
system that operates beyond human (and allegedly, political) relations, which situates his 
work askew to that of legal geographers. However, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos himself 
stumbles over this hurdle when he tries to think about spatial justice, and he finds himself 
always linking it back to the relationship to the human.208 More importantly though, I 
believe we cannot escape the law as a human construct. Yet, despite the fact that it exists 
as such, we can attempt to think the place of other agents within it, as it is a mechanism 
that affects, and is affected by, these other agents, particularly the more-than-human 
entities that appear within the context of Indigenous law as well. Therefore, we are 
challenged to think of a de-centered human legal subject, but to engage with the 
asymmetrical power relations and potential responsibility of that human subject at the 
same time.  
Withdrawal plays an important role in how Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos frames this 
relationship. It is the ontological condition of the posthuman legal subject in his theory of 
spatial justice. If all bodies engage in this simultaneous movement of making space and 
taking up space, then we can understand that lawscapes, the sites where legal bodies (or 
assemblages) emerge, can be reoriented or reconfigured. Building on deconstructionist 
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theoretical perspectives on the ethics of withdrawal (e.g. Emmanuel Levinas) 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos attempts to capture the material and situated nature of 
withdrawal, which he establishes through Deleuze’s concept of the fold, as I discussed in 
the earlier chapter.  
With respect to the process of withdrawal as practice, Luigi Russi provides us with a 
useful definition of the movement at the heart of this onto-epistemological legal practice: 
“withdrawal is, in other words, an instance of sensing the strings as propaedeutic to 
new stirrings, and the stirrings as situated in a tenso-structure of strings, feeling the 
pull of both and not making either invisible.”209 
 
It is this capability of withdrawal as a means of uncovering and sitting with complexity 
and contingency (or the history210) of a situation, in order to understand the implications 
it holds for legal subjectivity and judgment. Indigenous story-telling, as a resurgent 
practice, is a productive way of engaging with complexity and contingency in legal 
contexts, not only because it draws on the past, but because it is also actively (and 
openly) crafting a future. For example, the role of figures like the Trickster expose 
ambivalences and perform a situated ethics, which contribute to processes of 
understanding land (and spatial contexts) as “a living entity we live with and generate 
knowledge through.”211 Perhaps the most notable and creative aspect of Indigenous 
philosophy rests in the fact that it allows us to sit with contradiction, disagreement, and 
difference, in order to understand the tensions that give rise to particular contexts, and to 
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find individual solutions while simultaneously being attuned to the orientations of the 
collective.  
3.3.2 Indigenous Resurgent Practices as Withdrawal 
I argue that resurgent practices are a form of withdrawal, in the sense that they engage in 
a ‘turning away’ or perhaps a ‘turning into’ an engagement with the land. For example, 
walking traditional paths and regenerating a relationship and understanding of the land 
can give rise to Indigenous legal subjectivities that have been previously ignored.212 This 
practice is ultimately performed with the objective of reorienting the Canadian settler-
colonial lawscape, as it slowly reveals the atmospherics of the law by demonstrating how 
these spaces, national parks or public spaces brim with Indigenous knowledge already. In 
fact they always had, as Leanne Simpson powerfully reminds us,213 and the processes that 
maintain the lawscape, or rather, have elevated it to the level of atmosphere have 
contributed to a dissimulation of law’s violence through forgetting.214  
This practice is indeed a path forward, and it inevitably brings the settler along with it as 
it reorients lawscape, our spaces of living. These processes can be visible and invisible, 
as Indigenous law can operate much in the same way as the common law does within the 
lawscape,215 and these processes are necessarily experienced in a variety of ways 
depending on the location and tension inherent in the assemblages that are withdrawing. 
Some practices of resurgence may be more successful than others in shifting the 
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lawscape, however, the form of engagement is the same throughout and it demonstrates 
how processes of resurgence are necessary to the project of reconciliation. Indeed, as 
Borrows noted, resurgence and reconciliation are inextricably linked, not in the sense of a 
process of recognition, but in the sense that there is a shift in the material contexts of 
existence, facilitated through resurgence, that will inevitably shift the settler-colonial 
system. Therefore, I do not believe his project operates to the exclusion of the projects of 
those who are interested in more radical aspects of resurgent practice, like Simpson or 
Coulthard.  
Yet, resurgent practice also signals a distinctive relationship to the land, and an important 
step in claiming Indigenous sovereignty is to understand it through the lens of co-
existence rather than the lens of ownership. A different understanding of property must 
emerge in order to frame the legal subject in this case, which is the reason why I return to 
this problem, and why the relationship to spatiality and land is an important one.216 The 
lawscape is shifting, re-arranging, and yet, influencing other lawscapes’ reorientations. 
As I mentioned before, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, as well as Russi, note spatial 
justice’s relationship to Indigenous practices and the idea of co-extensive relationship 
between land and law, specifically through the well-known example of the ‘songlines’ 
performed by particular Australian Indigenous peoples.217 It is easier to single out these 
practices as forms of understanding the law through its material performance rather than 
only its abstract form. The regeneration of law and land requires a withdrawal from a 
colonial lawscape, in order to expose what has always been there.218 
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3.3.3 Performing Spatial Justice through Indigenous Resurgence 
Spatial justice, and the onto-epistemological framework within which it has been 
structured, presents an alternative to the “ontological priority of the dualism” through the 
idea of simultaneity and interstitionality.219 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos explains this 
idea as follows: 
“One, therefore, has to follow very closely what Brighenti means when he writes ‘the 
interstice is rather the outcome of a composition of interactions and affections of 
multiple parts that coexist in various ways within a given spatial situation’…Rather 
than synthesis, an interstice is an emergence (which means, it lies beyond 
prescription, controlled mechanics and systematic articulation of the result).”220  
This notion of the ‘middle’ or the primacy of the interstice is important when we consider 
a practice of Indigenous law which embraces the notion of conflict and ambiguity as 
central to ethical practice. Thinking through this context as emergence allows us to 
understand identity as situated in a context (in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ case this is 
how an assemblage functions), yet capable of overcoming and shifting into new 
formulations if necessary.221 To draw on Borrows, for example, direct action 
operationalizes not necessarily as an oppositional mechanism, but rather as a productive 
interstice. As we have seen in descriptions of the Uni’stot’en camp and blockade, 
Indigenous leaders declare these sites as ‘gateways’ in order to highlight the fact that they 
were sites of learning through resistance. This kind of practice allows us to understand 
how spatial justice can be productive and transformative, while it is resistant. Although 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos urges us to remember that the radical potential of these 
spaces can be “co-opted, overcoded and used in ways that go against the very idea of 
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rhizome,”222 it is useful to consider the role of direct action and the application of 
Indigenous law.  
What I am proposing, then, is that if we want to understand a performance of spatial 
justice, we must look to the work being done by Indigenous peoples in processes of 
resurgence and reconciliation with the land and the more-than-human.  This form of 
performativity within the ambit of an assemblage or a collectivity, as one of many, helps 
us understand how particular forms of identity and subjectivity can take shape without 
having to rely on an essentialist position. The collective agency of assemblages reminds 
us that subjectivities are always moving from the abstract to the concrete by necessity. 
That law is abstract, in so far as we need it to be this way in order to understand how to 
act, but its application is always material, always grounded. We cannot escape the 
‘politics of locality’ as Braidotti would state, and a performance of spatial justice requires 
first and foremost the recognition that this political dimension extends not only to the 
human relations that unfold onto that locality, but how they unfold through it. This 
process, as noted above by Robertson, requires attentiveness and slowing down, a process 
of thinking through the stirrings of withdrawal, and noting the tensions at the interstices 
of the assemblage.  
As Jill Stauffer notes, there is a tendency to treat colonial settlement as a fait accompli, 
instead of seeing it 
“as a force that requires continual renewal, that might make clear not only that it 
is up to all of us to choose between different possible outcomes, ‘but the 
durability, consistency, scope and consolidation of the phenomena’ can be called 
into question, and non-Natives can begin to ask how their everyday actions, 
aspirations and goals contribute meaningfully to a continuing settler colonial 
regime (Rifkin, 327).”223  
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Drawing on Mark Rifkin’s work in Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday 
Colonialism in the American Renaissance, Stauffer demonstrates, in effect, how the 
atmospherics of the law, in this colonial legality, function to dissimulate law’s violence, 
and the reproduction of forms of colonial violence through setter deference to the status 
quo.  
I note Stauffer’s work because performing spatial justice is not necessarily a process that 
befalls Indigenous peoples to the exclusion of the settler, or that the burden of undoing 
Canada’s colonial present is solely within the hands of Indigenous peoples in Canada. A 
tilted continuum reflects the inherent power relations within assemblage formations and 
within the lawscape, however, through withdrawal, bodies have the ability to shift the 
parameters of the assemblage. By framing agency in this manner there is a break in 
oppositional thinking to suggest that the ability to resist or withdraw is a conative 
mechanism that is available to all agents, including the more-than-human, and it can be 
effected through allegiances and complicity with other assemblaging actors in order to 
effectively produce transformative change.  
3.4 Rupturing the Lawscape through Indigenous 
Resurgence 
In the following section I will discuss two examples of how it is that we can approach a 
practice of spatial justice, or an affirmative ethical relation, which I believe demonstrate 
how the lawscape is ruptured and a glimmer of spatial justice is revealed. Both of these 
examples are situated within a legal context, as they reveal the tension between 
Indigenous law and Canadian legal systems. The first example is an analysis of a 
performance art piece by Rebecca Belmore, entitled Facing the Monumental, which took 
place on Canada Day in 2012 in Queen’s Park, in front of the Legislative Assembly of 
Ontario. It was through Leanne Simpson’s re-telling of this event224 that I first understood 
what performing spatial justice may look like, and the reason why I thought it was 
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important to think about it in relation to Indigenous law and practices of resurgence. In 
the second example, I wanted to consider a more well-known spatial context for 
Indigenous resistance, the blockade. Given the recent news coverage of the protests at the 
Unist’ot’en homestead, as well as these First Nations’ rich history of resistance and 
successful transformation of the Canadian common law system,225 I thought it would be a 
productive case-study for this project. 
3.4.1 Rebecca Belmore’s Facing the Monumental (2012) 
Rebecca Belmore’s performance art piece, Facing the Monumental is an example of 
resurgence, as well as a lesson in Indigenous law. By drawing on Indigenous traditions, 
through the inclusion of Mitigomizh, an old oak tree, as a central part of the performance, 
Belmore produces a reorientation of the lawscape of Queen’s Park. The outcome of this 
action is to reveal the depth and source of Indigenous knowledge present in a part of the 
city that otherwise seems to brim with the legal authority of the colonial state.  
As I draw my knowledge of this event from a description provided by Leanne 
Betasamosake Simpson, I have included her re-telling of this performance below:  
“The site of Belmore’s performance was Queen’s Park, in the expanse of a large, 
old oak tree, Mitigomizh, in our language. 
 
There were four pots of Nibi (water), and three large plastic bottles of water 
marking the front of the space, telling me that this performance was going to be 
about women. Nibi within Anishinaabeg philosophy carries within it many 
complex teachings and it is also a strong reference to women. There are four 
female spirits responsible for the water in the oceans, the fresh water, the water in 
the sky and the water within our bodies. Nibi is the responsibility of women. Nibi 
is women’s sovereignty. 
 
Belmore began by leading her three shkaabewisag (helpers) around the 
Mitigomizh that would become the focal point for the work. Over the next hour, 
large sheets of brown kraft paper were unrolled, moistened with spray bottles of 
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water and carefully wrapped around the tree over and over. They used Nibi to 
hold the sheets together. 
 
At first, the tying of the brown paper around the tree seemed like a marker to me. 
My attention was exclusively on Mitigomizh. It was the Elder, the Nokomis in the 
park. I imagined the destruction Nokomis had witnessed over the course of her 
life. I thought of all of the water held by her roots and in her body. I thought of all 
the black oak trees, and black oak savannas that are no longer in Mississauga 
territory. I noticed the hordes of people walking by the tree, not noticing, on their 
way to see the horse statue and the legislature. For an hour, we sat or stood, 
talking and laughing quietly with our friends, eating and drinking and looking at 
Nokomis, the old oak tree in the context of water. We watched as our water was 
used to hold together the paper, methodically being wrapped around our 
grandmother. 
 
I remembered the murdered, the missing, the stolen, the erased. I remembered 
generation after generation after generation after generation of our warrior 
women. I remembered the generations yet to come. 
 
When Mitigomizh was wrapped with the paper, it reminded me of a sexy, 
strapless party dress, with ruching from top to bottom, and one asymmetrical strap 
coming across her shoulder, where Belmore had attached the gown to the tree (by 
initially throwing the paper tied to a yellow rope over a very tall branch). 
 
Mitigomizh for me had become sexualized through no choice of her own. She was 
aesthetically beautiful, but then she was also aesthetically beautiful before the 
performance began. I had just forgotten to notice. 
 
Then, one of the shkaabewis, dressed in her own black party dress with long and 
with flowing black hair sat in the lap of Mitigomizh. Belmore took the wig off the 
shkaabewis’s head and placed it over her faced. Then she continued to wrap the 
shkaabewis into the tree with the paper. All the while, our sacred water was being 
used as the glue. Eventually, our Anishnaabekwe disappeared. 
 
Belmore then sat on the ground, in front of the pots of water, facing at the 
Mitigomizh and the disappeared Anishnaabekwe. 
 
That in and of itself was emotionally moving. 
 
Then, the pinnacle. 
 
The peace was suddenly and without warning shattered by the sound of gunfire. I 
immediately thought of Oka, and the sounds of bullets terrorizing the pines. The 
violence of the explosion vibrated through my body and the ground. 
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The twenty one gun salute felt like the brutal targeting and assassination of 
Indigenous women disguised as a salute and an honouring, which speaks to the 
insidious and manipulative nature of colonialism, helping, reconciliation and the 
dangers of perpetually placing Indigenous women in the context of victimhood… 
 
The brilliance of Belmore’s work is always for me in its apparent nuanced 
simplicity, that hours and days later becomes more and more complex. It is the 
very best of Indigenous storytelling grounded in the very same process that have 
brought meaning to the lives of our Ancestors – multi-dimensionality, repetition, 
abstraction, metaphor and multiple sites of perception. In short, a multi-layered 
conversation whose meaning shifts through time. 
 
At the end of the performance, Belmore took the wig off of her shkaabewis’s face 
(the lovely Cherish Blood, Blackfoot woman from the Blood reserve) and helped 
her out of the wrappings and down off the tree. The image of Rebecca extending a 
hand to Cherish and Cherish bursting through the bonds of 500 years of 
oppression with a huge smile on her face is one of the images seared into my 
memory from that day. The others, I’ll carry with me, and every time I pass by a 
Mitigomizh, wherever I am in the world, I will now remember the fierce, gentle, 
beautiful, nurturing nation building spirit of Indigenous women. 
 
Rebecca Belmore takes (back) her (our) space (land) in the world and her work 
compels me to take (back) my (our) space (land) in the world. Yesterday, she took 
every Mitigomizh in my territory back, no matter where they grow. She 
embedded the story of Anishinaabekwewag into their bark, and in doing so she 
liberated the story of Indigenous women from the bonds of victimhood. 
 
And for those gift, I say Chi’Miigwech to Rebecca, because today I feel slightly 
more healed than I did yesterday.”226 
By challenging the lawscape of Queen’s Park, Ontario’s legislative core, Belmore 
recreates for her audience a site of Indigenous knowledge, and reminds them that it was 
always there. As Simpson notes, Mitigomizh is an Elder, a Nokomis (grandmother), and 
within its core she contains knowledge of this area that dates back generations. Therefore, 
through the reorientation of the lawscape, a different legislative core is revealed, the site 
of Indigenous knowledge. Belmore’s actions transcend the boundaries of art, into the 
realm of law. This performance is a law-making movement and a political statement that 
reveals a deference to (and care for) the more-than-human.  
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Although Belmore’s work reorients the lawscape of Queen’s Park, whether that 
reorientation can produce additional reorientations, and whether it can reverberate 
beyond that one event to produce spatial justice remains to be seen. However, by 
revealing the atmospherics of Queen’s Park, she demonstrated the sleight of hand 
employed by settler colonialism in order to maintain its legal and political legitimacy 
over the land. Arguably, performing spatial justice, and the effects of this kind of practice 
hinge on an undoing of the practices of colonialism, by revealing them and by engaging 
in other forms of action. The lawscape will always be part of how it is that law, space and 
the body interact, however, it is possible to reorient the lawscape in order to create new 
political and legal possibilities. Law and space, the tensions inherent in political contexts 
and the complexity and messiness of these spaces is not something that disappears or can 
be replaced by Indigenous law, as a different way to ‘do’ law. Rather, it attunes us to the 
different layers and realities of law that have always been here, but have been 
dissimulated away by particular concentrations of power.  
In anticipation of Belmore’s exhibit at the Art Gallery of Ontario, Leanne Simpson 
captures the spirit of the artist’s ethics when she describes her decolonial project:  
 
“This is what colonialism in 2018 feels like. This relentless struggle of carrying 
forward that which is meaningful, despite being bound, despite monumental 
obstacles, is a struggle towards sky, towards freedom. The sharp focus on the 
artist, the fortitude of concentration, her relentless determination and her sound as 
she reaches the top, is affirmation. Yes, we will win. We already have.”227  
A performance of spatial justice requires that we take stock of the asymmetries of power 
that inform our positionality and our material and spatial configurations, and then that we 
reconfigure the parameters of the assemblage in order to allow the possibility for 
transformative change. What Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and others are suggesting is 
that the reconfiguration takes place in and through the spaces of existence, that it is 
limited and supported by these spaces. Belmore’s movements, her chosen site, the 
partnership with the old oak tree, as well as her helpers allow us to understand that in 
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order to reframe the legality of the spaces of everyday life, and to challenge power 
relations, we need to engage with the more-than human agents that inform material 
practice. Simpson herself draws attention to the importance of an engagement with space 
and body:  
 “I’m drawn to the idea of transforming colonial space into decolonizing space, 
and so I think about my body, my presence and my surroundings as material as 
well…Belmore’s work is concerned with violence, but that it takes us elsewhere, 
it doesn’t stay in the pain. It affirms our truths, but it is also generative.”228 
By allowing us to consider the co-constitutivity of law and space at the level of the body, 
legal geographers, and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos in particular, have challenged us to 
consider a dimension of law that is often overlooked, one that is exercised with respect to 
the limitations of the body, socio-legal spaces, and more importantly, those who form our 
collective assemblages (human and more-than-human alike). 
3.4.2 Wet’suwet’en Nation’s Unist’ot’en Camp and Blockade 
The use of blockades in protests on traditional territories is a common form of direct 
action utilized by Indigenous communities.229 It remains an effective and immediate way 
of affirming Indigenous sovereignty within traditional territories. These are sites of 
resistance, as they are physical barriers to external access, and they are also sites of 
knowledge production. The Unist’ot’en camp provides a particularly important example 
of how these places can advance Indigenous resurgence by acting as sites through which 
to teach and engage with traditional Indigenous knowledge.230 The Unist’ot’en maintain 
that the “homestead is not a protest or demonstration. [Their] clan is occupying and using 
[its] traditional territory as it has for centuries.”231 The camp is an example of a practice 
of spatial justice, as it demonstrates that these seemingly liminal and divisive spaces can 
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actually lend themselves to productive and regenerative interactions. The Unist’ot’en 
camp is an example of a resistant and productive activity, and it acts to reorient the 
lawscape by opening up a space that brims with Indigenous sovereignty. The work being 
undertaken by the Wet’suwet’en is also likely to impact and shift forms of practice in 
other communities, leading to the reorientation of multiple lawscapes and creating the 
possibility of spatial justice.  
3.4.2.1 Background 
Unist’ot’en clan is affiliated with the Knedebeas (Dark House) house group which is one 
of thirteen house groups that form the lineage of the Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs, and 
as a whole, operate under the name of the Wet’suwet’en Nation.232 According to 
Wet’suwet’en Nation, the hereditary chiefs claim jurisdiction over the traditional territory 
and the activities that take place on it, whereas the Wet’suwet’en First Nation, formed 
under the Indian Act, 1876, has jurisdiction only over the operations of the band and 
reserve.233 This important distinction demonstrates a substantial shift and definition of the 
lawscapes within which these groups operate, as well as the more explicit relationship to 
the more-than-human, advocated by the hereditary chiefs, who give more prominence to 
their stewardship role. 
The Unist’ot’en camp has been in place for more than a decade; it began as an anti-
pipeline initiative.234 In the fall of 2018, after the Canadian government praised the 
kicking-off of the Coastal Gaslink Pipeline, the Unist’ot’en camp and the Gidimt’en 
checkpoint were re-introduced as sites of opposition in the larger Canadian national 
discourse, and solidarity protests were held across the country. However, as I mentioned 
above, what is oftentimes missing from the Canadian national discourse is the fact that 
the Unist’ot’en camp is also a “home and a place of healing for Wet’suwet’en people” 
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according to the Hereditary Chief of the Laksamshu Clan.235 The site is a place where 
traditional knowledge is shared and regenerated, in particular with respect to healing 
those affected by addiction, among other issues. It is a site that is perpetually engaging in 
a process of un-doing the harmful effect of colonialism on the community.  
The impact of Indigenous resurgence practices on the lives of the Wet’suwet’en is 
undeniable, in particular through the re-establishment of a relationship with the land.236 
As Leah Temper notes,  
“Instead of appealing outwards, its aim is to create a space for what Coulthard (2014) 
refers to as ‘self-recognition’ and Indigenous re-affirmation. In this newly reclaimed 
space, the Unist’ot’en camp members have been able to assert their own legal 
understandings, and to live their concept of justice through practice, through 
enactment and through antagonistic politics that disrupt the economic and social logic 
and production of settler-colonial power.”237 
Therefore, this checkpoint, or as the camp members call it, “a gateway to understanding 
truth and meaningful  ecolonization,”238 is a significant site where we can see spatial 
justice not in a distributive sense, as a distribution of resources or territorial control, but 
rather as a transformative mechanism that hinges, primarily, on re-establishing a distinct 
relationship with the land. Then, the Unist’ot’en camp and the other checkpoints reflect 
the mutual constitutivity of law and spatiality, the formation of a lawscape, one that is 
capable of reflecting Indigenous legal frameworks beyond the relation with the Crown.  
3.4.2.2 The ‘Rule of Law’ and Rupturing the Colonial Lawscape 
The recent stand-off on Wet’suwet’en territory concluded in January 2019 with the 
enforcement by Royal Canadian Mounted Police of an interim injunction obtained by 
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Coastal Gaslink Pipeline Ltd, which resulted in the arrest of 14 individuals.239 The 
intervention has been justified through the application of the ‘rule of law’, or simply, 
compliance with the court order that granted the injunction. However, as it has been 
stated elsewhere, this concept, which is supposed to reflect order and fairness in a legal 
system, instead reflects the imposition of a colonial lawscape. The only means through 
which to stop or reverse this process is through forms of resurgence and reconciliation, 
and the slow recalibration of not only territory, but of the ways in which the relationship 
to land and the more-than-human is reframed. In this sense, Temper’s notion of 
environmental justice is tangential with spatial justice.  
The invocation of the ‘rule of law’ in this case reminds me of Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ own claim for an apolitical relationship between law and spatiality, 
specifically stemming from the desire to understand law’s universal, even and fair 
application, or more accurately, the fact that law dispenses violence against all, 
equally.240 The example presented in the case of the Wet’suwet’en is a reminder that 
there is no such thing as fair or even application of the law, and that the co-constitutivity 
of law and spatiality, and its reorientation is inherently political. Or rather, that it is not 
particularly helpful to think of justice, indeed spatial justice, without recognizing the 
political extensions that rest at its core.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Indigenous resurgent practices demonstrate how forms of political and legal engagement 
can unfold through cooperation with the land and the more-than-human, demonstrating a 
substantial way through which the lawscape can be reoriented and spatial justice 
performed. These sites of engagement are legally affirmative and politically resistant. 
Although an engagement with the non-human or the more-than-human is central to these 
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processes, we can note the shifting lawscape as these agents are positioned at the center 
of legal and political engagement. Laws gain liveliness (as lifeways) and sustain the 
possibility of politics (contradiction) through negotiation. This chapter demonstrated 
what an engaged practice of spatial justice may look like, and how this form of 
engagement can lead the way to understanding more attuned and complex political 
responses to significant legal questions.  
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Conclusion 
4 Conclusion 
This project stemmed from an interest in the relationship between law and spatiality, as 
well as its implications with respect to legal subjectivity and nonhuman legal agency. A 
central question for this study is whether politics has a place in Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice, and how it is that we may think of politics and 
social justice in a posthumanist context. By drawing out the Deleuzo-Guattarian 
foundations of spatial justice, and by comparing the concept of withdrawal to Indigenous 
resurgence, I demonstrated that there is a political praxis at the core of this theory through 
the process of performing spatial justice. Moving forward, I suggest that we consider how 
it is that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ concept of spatial justice fits into a discussion 
about posthumanist social justice. Rosi Braidotti noted that there is a pressing need to 
consider the implications of a posthumanist ethics and what role posthumanism can play 
in discussions of social justice moving forward, and I believe spatial justice can act as a 
starting point. 
This concept also provides critical legal theorists interested in the nonhuman and legal 
subjectivity with a theoretical perspective that shifts beyond traditional rights discourses. 
Legal practice is already contending with increasing questions about novel legal subjects, 
like the environment or animals, and the influence of technological innovation, especially 
with respect to artificial intelligence (AI). Questions regarding these ethical relationships 
have only recently gained momentum within the ambit of legal theory. Andreas 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ theory of spatial justice should be considered closely in 
this context as well. In particular, it would be interesting to see how the concepts that 
form this theory of spatial justice, like the lawscape and atmosphere, can be applied in a 
digital/virtual context. At the early stages of writing, I considered focusing my third 
chapter on the use of blockchain technology as a means of providing stateless Rohingya 
individuals with an alternative form of citizenship through the introduction of a form of 
digital identity. How would this project challenge the subjective and spatial positioning 
of the citizen? How will AI be used in relation to these digital identities, and what spatial 
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and material implications might arise? Where will there be opportunities to reorient the 
lawscape and perform spatial justice in relation (and through) the virtual realm? 
As well, as a starting point for these forays into novel legal subjects, I propose a more 
robust engagement with Indigenous legal philosophy as it can re-shape our understanding 
of a relationship with the natural environment. As well, I believe that there are 
opportunities for thinking about posthumanism alongside the relational philosophies that 
emerge from Indigenous thought, in particular with respect to the practice of spatial 
justice. As I noted in the thesis, and as others have argued, there is an unacknowledged 
debt to Indigenous knowledge in posthumanist thought, or at least there is a gap in 
theoretical scholarship that engages more pointedly with these two theoretical fields. 
Although through my research I noted an overlap in these two fields with respect to 
spatiality, Indigenous theoretical perspectives and the more-than-human, I believe that a 
deeper engagement is necessary. Furthermore, conventional forms of legal practice would 
benefit from the influence and input of Indigenous legal traditions, beyond questions of 
environmentalism or constitutionalism. Although spatial justice provides an entry point 
into this discussion, it would be useful to understand the deeper implications Indigenous 
legal traditions could have on the common law as well.  
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